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CITY LAW IN A NEW WORLD
By

CHARLES

S.

RHYNE

Charles S. Rhyne is General Counsel of the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers and pastpresident of the American Bar
Association. He attended Duke
University and Duke Law School
and received the LL.B. degree from
George Washington University Law
School. He has been awarded honorary degrees from Duke Univer
sity, George Washington University, and Loyola University. He is
the author of numerous books and
his participation in civic and legal
affairs has brought national and
international recognition to him.
(This article was written by Mr. Rhyne as an introduction to
our special municipal law issue of DICTA. We are most grateful to
Mr. Rhyne and the other authors contributing to this symposium
issue. -The Editors)
THE ERA OF CHANGE

Are developments in the field of municipal law keeping pace
with developments in the fields of science, technology, medicine and
other dynamic fields of endeavor? Is there dynamic progress in any
field of law that is keeping pace with a man-made satellite that is
capable of beaming back radio messages from 39 million miles out
in space, or another capable of returning photographic pictures of
weather conditions around the world?
If there is the sliehtest hesitation in answering these questions
affirmatively, then it is time for lawyers to pause in the head-long
rush of events and evaluate the lecal situation. If law is to be effective it must be advanced and respected at the grass roots - the
municipal and county level. The city, t@wn and county lawyer is in
a strategic position to direct the cooperative efforts necessary to
bring about a revolution in the acceptance and respect for law in
the new world. The enormity of the field of municipal activity today
gives a vastness and complexity to the field of municipal law which
was unknown a few years ago. Law in the modern city is indeed an
ever changing, ever developing and rapidly expanding subject. New
law to meet new problems and needs is being made almost daily.
Law governing the modern city is difficult to find and define.
In order to render an informed opinion on important legal questions
the city attorney must often analyze hundreds of reported and unreported cases. In addition, he must give attention to federal and state
constitutional provisions, to federal and state statutes, to developments in the Congress and the state legislature, to rulings, regulations, orders and decisions by state and federal agencies and corn-
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missions, to opinions by other city attorneys and state and federal
attorneys general, to ordinances enacted in his and other cities, and
to countless other sources of information. Lately, with the great increase in international treaties and agreements, the city attorney
must in some instances also investigate this rapidly growing field
of law and its effect on his municipal law problem.
Municipal government in its every action touches the people in
their daily lives more intimately than any other governmental form.
And every action by the municipality must be justified under its
legal powers. The modern municipal attorney cannot be content
with knowing and being able to find answers to existing legal
problems. He must look to the future. One authority has stated the
problem in this way:
The awareness among the American people of the need
for new ideas in science, in education, in engineering, and
in architecture is a fact of life in the 20th century. But few
people are as aware of the need for new law, or the importance of new law so that ours will continue to be a government of law, not men. Lost sight of is the fact that where
the march of man in any field outraces the existing rules
of law there is trouble under the American governmental
system.'
A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL NEEDED
First the lawyer needs a reappraisal of himself. The legal profession as a whole has a tendency to be "stuffy" and egotistical. The
average lawyer has a feeling that law is a mysterious art that can
be practiced and expounded only by the initiated. This attitude permeates the local public and creates an aura of disesteem. That which
is mysterious and not understood is not effective. It is adhered to
by force and not respect.
It follows that lawyers must awaken to the need for cooperation. Drafting a complicated ordinance is no longer a task to be
performed by the attorney in the confines of his library or with
his feet elevated to the top of his desk with microphone in hand. It
has become a team proposition. Satellites are transmitting advanced
knowledge of the universe from new frontiers of space only because
of the teamwork of scientists, physicists, mathematicians, technologists and others. It is much easier for a municipal attorney to sit
at his desk and copy a proposed law from the better parts of ordinances of several other cities, hand it to the city legislative body and
have it passed. This procedure, however, perpetuates a mode of
action antagonistic to the public. How much more acceptable the
new law would be if produced on a cooperative basis.
A housing ordinance can serve as an example. The American
Public Health Association developed a minimum housing standards
ordinance over a period of nine years. A tremendous amount of
research and work went into this effort. It is an excellent ordinance,
and adequate to do the job. An attorney need look no further for a
technically correct ordinance. Adopted, however, in accordance with
the usual procedure it has little chance of success. It fails because
it is not understood by the person designated to enforce it; the
1 23 NIMLO Municipal Low Rev. 18 (1960).
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builder does not see the necessity for it, and the public is not aware
of the need for it.
The jet age approach to this particular problem would be one
of cooperation, and could assume the following procedure: The attorney could form a team composed of a representative from the
building department, one from the department of public health and
one from the public relations department. This group would carefully organize an advisory committee composed of representatives
of the building industry, business, the home owners, the medical profession, civic and service organizations, news media, labor, and the
other representatives peculiar to the particular locality. At the first
meeting, spokesmen would explain the need for a housing ordinan'e,
pointing out the health hazards involved in sub-standard housing, the
unequal tax burden created by this type of structure, the blight on
the city, and all other reasons necessitating the legislation. Thus, as
the ordinance takes shape each representative has had a chance to
contribute, and, more importantly, to explain the contents and the
need to the people whom he represents. It may well be that the
ordinance is word for word as it would have been without this
procedure. On the other hand, it may be a watered down version,
but it is better to have a milder one that is enforcable than a strong
one that is ignored. Many public-relations-conscious-attorneys
recognize this technique and take full advantage of it.
One municipal attorney stated the problem this way: "This..
is a very emotional problem .

. .

. If you don't create the proper
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and forget this whole subject of conflicts of interest. '2 He points out
that an attorney working with a difficult point of law may feel that
it is ridiculous that members of the city council do not understand3
the problem. "But the facts of life are that they do not understand.
If the council does not understand a problem, it is much more likely
that the public as a whole will not understand.
Secondly, a complete, critical reappraisal of law and government in America is needed without waiting for a crisis. Most informed people will concede that law has been outdistanced. It is
generally known that state governments still operate largely on
law designed for the agrarian society of the horse and buggy rather
than the urban society of the space age. On the national level an
ever burgeoning bureaucracy is not giving a governmental performance attuned to current-day needs. As the spenders of tax funds
get further from the watchful eyes of taxpayers, waste and extravagance become easier to hide. In order to shift to local performance
those governmental functions that can best be performed locally,
new law is needed as a cure for the problems of "bigness" and remoteness.
It is true throughout the nation, the state, and each grass root's
community that the absence of law, or the existence of weak or
inadequate, antiquated laws, retards progress. For example, few
cities have truly up-to-date codes of ordinances. In the vast majority
of cities, those ordinances that do exist are buried in the minutes
of the council along with all other business transacted by the
council, and in most instances there is no index through which the
ordinance may be found when needed. Recently, a municipal judge
was red-faced when it was pointed out to him that an ordinance
under which he had fined dozens of people during the preceding
year had been repealed just before he took office. This fact was
buried in the minute books of the council and known only to the
city records. Small wonder then that the public has an uncertain
confidence in local government. If they have little confidence in
local law, it is difficult to expect respect for state, federal and
international law.
A local movement to improve the legal situation can be started
by anyone with a little imagination and drive; but the logical person to initiate the movement, and the one whose opinions will be
most respected, is the municipal attorney.
MUCH PROGRESS

HAS

BEEN MADE

Many dynamic changes have been brought about and many
new laws developed in recent years. Hundreds of cities in all parts
of the nation have cleared away slums and wiped out blight. Visitors
returning to some of these rejuvinated municipalities are unable to
believe their eyes. Behind each of these changes is a carefully
thought out and diligently executed group of laws, made possible in
each instance through the cooperation of a group of assiduous and
dedicated people.
However, urgent problems remain which need immediate solution. Today, one can travel half the distance across the nation in a
powerful jet in the time it takes to cross some of our metropolitan
2 23 NIMLO Municipal Law Rev. 474 (1960).
8 Id. at 475.
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cities by land transportation. Mass transit has become one of the
most pressing problems facing large cities and many of the smaller
ones. The leadership that can be expressed in this vital field is
exemplified in the tremendous strides made in the city of Philadelphia and in the relatively small city of Ann Arbor, Michigan. In
Philadelphia the City Solicitor was one of three men appointed by
the mayor to a committee to propose a plan for rejuvinating the
mass transit system of that metropolitan area. A unique plan was
devised.4 In Ann Arbor the city purchased new buses to be paid for
on a monthly income basis. It then leased the entire equipment, and
employed the lessors as its manager-agent to have complete charge
of operations. Control was thus retained in the city. Through the
use of this system various state taxes were saved. It is anticipated
that this plan will soon operate at a profit.
These are but a few of the many examples of modern thinking
and action meeting the necessities of the electronic, push button
age. The difficulty lies in the fact that each move has come after a
great deal of damage has been done.
MODERN

CHALLENGE

There is a definite need for more attorneys to accept the modern
challenge and be first with new ideas and new legal means of solving complex problems. There is a great demand that more municipal
and community-conscious attorneys initiate solutions without waiting for city managers, city planners, scientists and others to create
legal problems that defy solution because they have not been timely
recognized. Local law must become and ever remain as modern and
up-to-date as rockets, satellites and jets.
There are examples of this forward thinking, advanced action.
In a few notable instances attorneys have become interested in
4 See the article "Metropolitan Transportation
Philadelphia, p. 224, infra.
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developing laws for the future. Notable strides have been made in
a few counties and municipalities in the field of zoning. Such laws
can only be developed in cooperation with people representing
varied professions. Early zoning laws regulated location of industries
designated by name, types of industry that would be permitted and
those that would be prohibited. The modern trend is to designate
the amount of noise in decibels, and the emission of odors in intensity. This is jet age thinking, taking care of future technological
advances before they occur.
Several progressive thinking attorneys have developed ordinances governing the establishment of heliports and setting flight
patterns for helicopters before their use is started in a particular
city.
In a majority of municipalities the city attorney of necessity
knows more of detail, policy, program and function than any other
city official. In almost every instance the municipal attorney is a
community leader or certainly a potential one. No greater service
could be rendered by him than to see that a standing advisory committee of representative citizens is organized and remains ever active in seeing that the city has a modernistic code of ordinances constantly kept up to date. Far too many municipalities are reluctant to
spend the necessary funds to arrange their ordinances into a modern
code. The city officials have not been brought to realize the great
importance of this vital tool. There certainly are few things for
which city funds could be spent that would be of more benefit.
Once the municipal code has received modernization, every attorney should take the necessary steps to make every citizen aware
that the local laws are the most modern, most practical and least
stifling that coordinated efforts of all groups can produce. This can be
accomplished with a public relations program actively administered
for the purpose-with a planned program patterned on that of Law
Day U. S. A., or on any well organized project adapted to the local
situation.
The instinct for law runs deep in America. No matter what the
city problem, someone will sooner or later say, "There ought to be
a law," and well there should be. The great challenge of the lawyer's
job is that it is endless, becoming more complex and more exciting
day by day, year after year. For every problem solved, there are
scores yet unsolved.
CONCLUSION

Law is the most important ingredient in our way of life, but
laws must be created and administered in a manner inspiring respect for law. There can be no esteem for antiquated, unreasonable
and inadequate law.
Countless local problems cry out and the members of the legal
profession have the responsibility of finding solutions. To the municipal attorney in particular is afforded the privilege and opportunity
to conceive and formulate local law that is attune with our modern
world.
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THE MUNICIPALITY AND MILK PRICES
By

DAVID STAHL

David Stahl received both his A.B.
and LL.B. degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. From 1942 to
1946 he served in the United States
Army. He has been a part-time
instructor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law since 1950.
Presently, he is a part-time instructor at Duquesne University Law
School in Pittsburgh. He was appointed City Solicitor for the City
of Pittsburgh in January, 1959. Mr.
Stahl is a member of the American,
Pennsylvania, and Allegheny Coun•tyBar Associations.
I. INTRODUCTION

An important trend of the post-war period is evidenced by the
,expanding role of the municipal attorney from watchdog of municipal contracts and defense counsel in tort actions to counsel for the
;city's consumer-citizens as well. Lack of consumer representation
before state and national regulatory agencies, an expanded concept
of the municipality's functions, and the urgent need for an advocate
representing the general public1 have been responsible for making
the municipality and the city attorneys spokesmen for consumers in
urban areas. While most municipal representation has been before
pubic utility or public service commissions, a few cities, including
the City of Pittsburgh, 2 have also represented the public's interest
in matters concerning the regulation of milk prices. As in other
matters pertaining to price regulation, the needs and welfare of the
general citizen can be easily overlooked by well-organized lobbies
of special-interest groups; the city can act as referee in highlighting
these needs and protecting the interests of the general public.
While state health regulation of milk dates back to the nineteenth century, governmental price regulation of milk products was
first initiated as a depression-fighting measure in the early 1930's
when an attempt was made to stabilize the precarious economic
position of the rural community. As stated in the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Act of 1937:
Milk producers must make deliveries of their highly
perishable commodity immediately after it is produced, and
must generally accept any market at any price .... Hence,
milk producers are subject to fraud and imposition, and do
.In the preparation of this paper, the author is indebted to Marion Finkelhor, Assistant City Solicitor
for the City of Pittsburgh, and gratefully wishes to acknowledge her assistance.
1 In the 1959 session of the Pennsylvania Legislature, H.B. 2347 was introduced to create a state
office of consumer counsel to represent the general public before regulatory agencies. The bill was
not enacted. A number of other states, however, do provide for consumer representation of this
nature at the state level.
2 The City of Pittsburgh has also represented the public in other non-utility proceedings, such
as hearings before the State Insurance Commissioner on Blue Cross and Blue Shield premiums and
.fire insurance rates.
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not possess the freedom of contract
necessary for the pro3
curing of cost of production.
New York passed legislation to control the price of fluid milk in
1933. By 1941,
approximately half of the states had passed similar
4
legislation.
The federal government also entered the field when key legislation was passed in 1933 and 1935. 5 These acts, however, limited
federal orders to producer-minimum prices. These orders are instituted only upon request of area-producers, 6 and are established by
formulas designed to maintain a relationship between the price of
milk and the national index of other prices.
The regulation of the price of milk has been sharply debated on
an urban-rural basis with political pressures from interested groups.
Smaller dealers or processors, as well as various farm groups, have
supported milk controls in an attempt to eliminate competitive practices of nation-wide milk-processing corporations. Today, as a
result, eighteen states7 have some form of milk price control, and
each year shows new legislative activity either to decontrol milk in
those states with controls, or to control it in those with free markets.8 Within the period 1958-1959, in three states presently controlled, the governor 9 either requested legislation to abolish controls
or vetoed more restrictive legislation. The legislative bodies of two
of the states introduced decontrol bills in 1959,10 and one state"
repealed state price control. Bills to initiate price regulation were
introduced in eleven states12 and one state 13 adopted a control law.
Within the eighteen states which presently regulate milk prices,
3 Pa. Laws 1937, P. L. 417, as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 31, § 700j-101 (1958).
4 COHO, Milk Price Control, A Developing Field of Administrative Law, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 254
(1941).
In Michigan, Utah, Maryland, Washington and Louisiana, the state supreme courts have held
the statutes to be unconstitutional: Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295
N.W. 346 (1940), (improper board members); Rowell v. State Board of Agricultture, 98 Utah 353, 99
P.2d 1 (1940), (lack of adequate standards); State v. Moitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939),
(unlawful delegation of Legislative Power); Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers v. Miller, 170 Md.
81, 182 AIl. 432 (1936), (invalid transfer of legislative responsibility); Griffiths v. Robinson, 181
Wash. 438, 43 P.2d 977 (1935), (lack of adequate standards). See generally annot. 119 A.L.R. 243
(1939); 155 A.L.R. 1383 (1945)
5 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 753 as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
6 In July 1960 there were 76 areas covered by federal milk.marketing orders.
7 Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia. See Appendix of state laws following this article.
8 U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Role of Governments in Pricing Fluid Milk in the United States,
Agricultural Marketing Series No. 335, (Sept. 1959).
9 Florida, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
10 Maine and Rhode Island.
11 Connecticut.
12 Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin.
13 Louisiana.
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there is statutory authority to regulate producer (i.e., farm) prices
in seventeen and resale prices in twelve. While most states, such as
Pennsylvania, regulate only the minimum price, this regulation frequently becomes the maximum. Statutes in Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, New Hampshire, Vermont and Virginia 14 authorize both a
minimum and maximum price. Most acts include some provision
requiring that dealers and handlers be licensed, that reports be filed
by dealers to assure payment of the established price, and that dealers furnish bonds to insure compliance with price regulations.
Administrative organization of milk controls ranges from a
single executive, usually attached to the State Agriculture Department, 15 to a commission which frequently includes representatives
of the special-interest groups directly concerned with the pricing
problem. As stated by Mr. Justice Spence of the California Supreme
Court, in commenting on the California Milk Marketing Act, "The
Act is aimed primarily at what the producer shall receive, and not at
what the dealer or consumer shall pay ....

In the administration of milk price-control laws a state may be
divided into pricing areas with or without special local control
boards in each area. While most statutes provide for the initiation
.of price -regulation by the commission, the statutes in New York,
Florida, Nevada, California, Alabama and Louisiana follow the federal practice, and do not institute controls without a petition from a
specified percentage of the producers in the price area.' 7 Other than
in their general position as voters, consumers usually have little
voice as to whether or not an area is controlled, and representatives
of consumer interests tend to be outnumbered as members of the
state commissions." However, in the final analysis, the urban
,dweller is the major purchaser of fluid milk and milk products, and
,so there is a need for the representation of his views in any price-fixing proceedings. While statutes generally contain language re.quiring consideration of consumer interests, obviously such interests
can be protected only by adequate representation.
II.

PARTY IN INTEREST

In many instances, a municipal corporation may bring a representative action on behalf of its citizens to protect a common right
even though these citizens could bring individual suits. As stated in
American Jurisprudence:
A municipality has authority to file a bill to restrain a
breach of a contract for the furnishing of utility service
under specified terms, notwithstanding its inhabitants or
citizens can redress the wrong individually or collectively,
and is a proper party in proceedings to require a public
service company to continue the performance of its public
service in a reasonably adequate manner for the benefit
of the municipality and its inhabitants ....19
14 Safeway Stores v. Milk Comm'n
to establish single price).

197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769 (1955) (commission denied power

15 New York, New Jersey and California are examples of this type of administrative organization.
16 Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d 485, 490, 234 P.2d 29 (1951).
17 Role of Governments in Pricing Fluid Milk in the Unifed States, op. cit., supra. Note 8, at 29-38.
18 The constitutionality of commissions composed of a majority of producers and dealers has
-been upheld: Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E. 2d 35 (1950); Fleisher v.
Duncan, 195 Ga. 309, 24 S.E. 2d 15 (1943). Thompson v. Statte Milk Control Board, 241 Ala. 100,
1 So. 2d 381 (1941). Contra, Johnson v. Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
19 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 720 (1941).
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Under this theory of consumer representation, it has become a common practice for the municipality to represent the public's interest
in price-fixing hearings before state and national regulatory
agencies.
Furthermore, national and state administrative procedure acts
have explained which persons are entitled to appear before an
administrative agency. While not applicable to state agencies, the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, for example, provides that:
So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any interested person may appear before any agency
• . .for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of
any issue, request, or controversy in any proceeding ....20
The Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Act of 1945,21 similar
to procedure acts in other states, is even more specific, and defines
a party with a "direct interest" to include "federal, state or local
instrumentalities, political subdivisions or officers thereof." A city
has been held to have a sufficient interest both as a consumer and
participate in
as a municipality to enable it to file complaints and
public utility hearings relating to gas2 2 and water 2' rates. This concept of persons entitled to appear before an administrative agency
is substantially broader than the common law doctrine of parties
with a legally-protected right.
Although the various milk-control statutes use different pricing
and administrative techniques, most statutes include the consumer
as an interested party in milk-pricing procedures. For example, the
California milk law defines "consumer" as "any person who buys
milk, cream or dairy products for consumption and not for resale,"
and further provides that "any order of the director thereunder
substantially affecting the rights of any interested party may be
reviewed by any court of competent jurisdiction.' 2 4 The Virginia
Milk Code provides for an appeal from a price order or any other
"general action, rule, regulation or order of the commission" by any
"aggrieved" person.25
The Pennsylvania Milk Control Law provides for notice of hearing to all "interested persons," i.e., "all persons who may be affected
by an order of the commission fixing prices,"2 6 and who have signified their desire to be notified. "Any person aggrieved" by an order
of the commission has the right to appeal.2 7 In interpreting these
provisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found producers to
be such an "aggrieved person" in an order affecting dealers;;2 1 but a
labor union representing the milk drivers throughout the state was
held not to be a party in interest even though the ruling regulating
deliveries woud affect some member-drivers. In Pennsylvania Crr-5'
mercial Drivers Conference v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n,- 1
Mr. Justice Linn stated:
Here, the general order appealed from is capable of
2060 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1952).
21 Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 71, § 1710.1 (Supp. 1959).
22 City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 158 Pa. Super, 229, 234, 44 A. 2d 614 (1945).
Cf., City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 153 Pa. Super, 83, 33 A.2d 641 (1943).
41, 39 N.E. 2d 356 (1942).
23 Inter.State Water Co. v. City of Danville, 379 Ill.
24 Cal. Agr. Code § 4255.
25 Va. Code Ann., § 3-371 (1950).
26 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 31 § 700i-801(1958).
27 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 31 § 700i-901 (1958).
28 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775, (1933).
29 360 Pa. 477, 484, 62 A.2d 9, 13 (1948).
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directly affecting only "persons engaged in business as milk
dealers, handlers or distributors, consumers and producers."
Therefore any effect which it may have upon persons employed by milk dealers, handlers and distributors individually, or upon their representative union, is a remote consequence of the order and is therefore indirect and incidental.
Similarly, dealers were held not to be a party in interest in a
pricing order limited to subdealers.30 But, in American Can Co. v.
Milk Control Board,31 the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that
the statutory designation "person aggrieved" 32 included a manufacturer of milk containers and granted the right to appeal from a milk
commission order. Mr. Justice Qua stated:
Furthermore, we think that a person "interested" and a
person "aggrieved" need not be within the c'ass of persons
who are directly commanded by the order of the board
either to act or to refrain from acting, nor
need he be
33
engaged in any branch of the milk business.
In interpreting their statute, the New York courts have limited
the right of appeal to only the parties of record; consequently, one
30
31
32
33

RieckDairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 69 Douph. 345 (Dauphin Co. C.P. Ct. 1958).
313 Mass. 156, 46 N.E.2d 542 (1943).
Mass. Ann. Lows. ch. 94A, § 21 (1954).
313 Mass. 156, 46 N.E.2d, 542, 544 (1943).
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who has not appeared at the public 3 hearing
was not qualified to
4
seek review of the commission's order.
In one case, the City of Pittsburgh appealed to the court from a
procedural ruling of the Pennsylvania commission, and the city's
status to maintain such an appeal was recognized.3 5 In Board of
Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n,36 an action against an order of
the Virginia Milk Control Commission was brought by both the
board and interested civic groups. Again, while the court rejected
the constitutional arguments of the parties, their right to bring the
action was not questioned.
The language of milk-control statutes appears to be sufficiently
broad in its recognition of consumer interests to permit action by
municipal governments to protect the common rights of all citizens.
III.

RATE OF RETURN

The early cases relating to milk price-control were primarily
concerned with the constitutionality of the new laws. Beginning in
1933, with the Rochester grocer who sold two quarts of milk and a
50 loaf of bread at the bargain price of 180, in violation of the 907
per quart order established by the New York Milk Control Board,
the status of milk as a product "affected with a public interest" has
withstood constitutional attack. As stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in
Hood & Sons v. DuMond:
Production and distribution of milk are so intimately
related to public health and welfare that the need for regulation to protect those interests has long been recognized
and is, from a constitutional standpoint, hardly controversial. Also, the economy of the industry is so eccentric
that economic controls have been found at once necessary
and difficult. These have evolved detailed, intricate and
comprehensive regulations, including price fixing. They
have been much litigated but were generally sustained by
this Court as within the power of the state .... 38
Questions as to whether
the statute was an unlawful delega40
tion of legislative power, 39 lacked adequate standards of control,
41
constituted special legislation or whether the emergency aspects
of the depression had ended 42 have in most instances been resolved
in favor of the state milk-control commissions. But the thorny problem of finding a standard by which to establish a "fair price" for
producer, dealer and consumer has remained.
Milk price statutes are usually based upon price schedules for
84 Niagara Frontier Co-operative Milk Producers v. DuMond, 297 N.Y. 75, 74 N.E.2d 315 (1947);
Beck v. Ten Eyck. 162 Misc. 5, 294 N.Y.S. 541 (1937). See also City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities
Comm'n 153 Pa. Super. 83, 33 A.2d 641 (1943).
85 City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Control Comm'n 5 D. & C. 2d 685 (Dauphin Co. C. P. Ct. 1954).
86 Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950).
37 Nebbla v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The present New York statute is limited to producer prices.
38 336 U.S. 525, 529 (1948).
39 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Franklin v. State, 232 Ala. 637, 169
So. 295 (1936); Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong. 141 N.J. 319, 102 A2d 372 (1954). Contra, Johnson v.
Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940). See also Ann., 110 A.L.R. 644 (1937);
119 A.L.R. 243 (1939); 155 A.L.R. 1383 1945).
40 Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950); Taylor v. State, 237
Ala. 178, 186 So. 463 (1939).
41 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). Contra, State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn.
623, 13 A.2d 586 (1940).
42 Como Farms, Inc., v. Foran, 6 N.J. Super. 306, 71 A.2d 201 (1950); Milk Comm'n v. Dade
County Dairies, 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
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different classes of milk and upon attempts to regulate the production of fluid milk by one of the following plans:
43
1. Base-rate quotas,
use, 44
of
2. Classification
45
3. Pooling of returns,
4. Relationship of fluid milk to manufactured
dairy products,
46
or to a general commodity price index.
Federal milk marketing orders utilize all four approaches, but
control may be terminated at the request of fifty percent of the
producers within the federal marketing area.
Orders by state regulatory bodies as to the minimum price to
be paid to producers and minimum or maximum- prices to be
charged by milk dealers are founded upon these basic marketing
plans, and may often provide an unrealistic picture of actual milk
prices. Thus, in states which authorize payment by the ultimate
utilization of the product, the "blend" or utilization price determines
the actual income of the producer rather than the individual price
for any given class of milk.4 7 Furthermore, the utilization price

may fall, even though the minimum price order does not change.
While these practices may seem remote to the urban consumer,
these factors are the paramount economic bases for milk price
control and directly affect the resulting retail prices.
Most state statutes and court decisions tend to emphasize the
factors of cost of production and distribution as the base for a
milk price which will yield a reasonable return to producer and
dealer. This is different from the more conventional criteria of
"net assets," "return on investment" or "net worth," which are
among the tools of public utility regulation.
The New York Act of 1937, as subsequently amended, requires
the commissioner to take into consideration the balance between
production and consumption of milk, "the cost of production and
43 Ala. Code Ann., § 223 (Supp. 1955). Base-rate quotas attempt to limit the production of milk
to the amount necessary to supply the fluid milk demands of the consumer by limiting each producer to a base quota for Class I, i.e., bottled milk. Production in excess of this allowance must be
sold at manufactured milk prices.
44 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 3
700-801 (1958). Classification of use provides for payment for the
producers output at a "blend price", based upon the ultimate utilization of the milk by the processor.
45 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21 § 258 (m) (1954); Cal. Agri. 21. Code § 4294. The system of
"pooling", originated by cooperative milk marketing associations and utilized by the Milk Control
Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture divides returns on an area basis so that
each producer receives an equivolent return for his total product regardless of the utilization of an
individual former's output.
4645 Stat. 753 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1 5 (1952).
47 For a complete discussion of the economic aspects of the "rate base" in milk control, see
Griswold, The Control "Rate Base" in Milk, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 135 (1941) and Coho, Milk Price ControlA Developing Field of Administrative Low, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 254 (1941).
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distribution . . .the cost of feeding stuffs . . . the supply of milk

in each market and the purchasing power and welfare of the
public. ' 48 The North Carolina Act of 1953 includes, in addition to
production and distribution costs, "the prices of other foods and
other commodities. '49 Resale prices in California, however, are
determined not only on production and distribution costs, but also
include "a reasonable return upon necessary capital investment,"
based upon representative distributors and retail stores engaged
in the distribution of milk.50 The Montana statute provides that
retail price of milk per quart shall not be more than "twice the
price paid by the distributor to the51producer for the same grade
and butterfat content of fluid milk.

In Pennsylvania, a "reasonable return" to the producer is defined as "cost of production and a reasonable profit," but the standard of a "reasonable return" for the dealer is undefined. In ascertaining a basis for arriving at a "reasonable return," the Pennsylvania statute further provides that "the commission shall utilize
a cross-section representative of the average '52
or normally efficient
producers and dealers or handlers in the area.
As early as 1934, the effect of fixed minimum prices upon the
high-cost processors was questioned by the Supreme Court in
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin.53 Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
The appellant would have us say that minimum prices
must be charged whenever a particular dealer can show
that the effect of the schedule in its application to himself
is to deprive him of a profit. This is not enough to subject
administrative rulings to revision by the courts. If the designation of a minimum price is within the scope of the
police power, expenses or losses made necessary thereby
must be borne as an incident, unless the order goes so far
beyond the needs of the occasion as to be turned into an act
of tyranny .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not pro-

tect a business against the hazards of competition. (Emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Colteryahn Dairy v. Milk
Control Comm'n, interpreted the Pennsylvania law as providing
that all factors enumerated in the statute should be considered
by the commission as follows:
The theory that segregation of the classes is essential
in determining fair return, no doubt led the court below to
adopt the sales dollar return as a convenient basis for price
fixing. We do not hold this theory incorrect applied to the
total business of the dealer although it is a new standard
and may produce a return of a very large per cent on fair
value. It may be that "fair return" should be based upon
the same rules governing the return of a public utility or
upon a combination of these two theories, or some other
standard may be adopted. We do not attempt to lay down
48 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21, 258 (m) (1954).
49 N.C. Gen. Stat.Ann., § 106-266.8 (Supp. 1959).
50 Cal. ASri. Code §§ 4354, 4360. See also Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Parker, 23 Cal.2d
137, 142 P.2 737 (1943); Jersey Milk Products v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
51 Mont. Rev. Code Ann., § 27-407 (1947).
52 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 31 1 700i-801 (1958). See also Nev. Rev. Stat., Tit. 51 1 584-568 (1959).
53 293 U.S. 163, 170 (1934).
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any theory of fair return. It is the duty of the Commission
to devise such a theory as will conform to the law, basing
54
its conclusion on sufficient evidence ....
The actual result of the Colteryahn decision, however, has
been to focus the attention of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission on the dealer's cost of production and the percentage of
net return on his sales. Calculation of costs is further complicated
by the Pennsylvania commission's practice of presenting these
dealer costs in evidence as an aggregate figure including the larger
as well as smaller dealers. In statistics prepared by the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission for a recent hearing held to fix
milk prices in the Pittsburgh area, a percentage of 1.89% return
on net sales yielded 10.39% return on net assets. This figure, obviously, is substantially larger than the permissible return in the
public utility field.5 5 Representatives of consumers, including the
City of Pittsburgh, have attempted to shift commission attention
to the inflationary aspect of "net sales" as the basis for milk prices.
The greatest problem in attempting to maintain existing price
patterns for consumers is probably the wide economic range represented by the various milk processors. Nationwide multi-product
dealers5 6 with large budgets and administrative costs compete with
the family-operated milk distributor. Under the New York milk
control statute of 1933, a price differential established between
advertised and non-advertised brands of fluid milk was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court as a valid classification based
upon existing trade practices. 51 In more recent years, however,
some consumer groups have successfully emphasized the need for
the settling of maximum as well as minimum prices. In a New
Jersey case decided in 1954, the court approved the power of the
state director to establish the minimum as the maximum price
under the New Jersey milk price control law. In interpreting this
statute which was silent on the question of maximum price, the
New Jersey court stated:
It is true that the immediate evil in 1933 was price
cutting . . . The legislative intervention was grounded entirely upon the public interest and the Legislature may
properly have believed that in undertaking to exercise control over the milk industry it ought empower its administrative agent not only to fix, if necessary, minimum prices fair
to the industry but also, if necessary, maximum prices fair
to the consuming public. 58
The broad legal standards of cost of production, rate of return
and fair price to consumers are only partial aspects of milk control
legislation. As in establishing a fair return in other regulated industries, the economic problems and conflicting economic interests
compete within the legal statutory framework.
54 332 Pa. 15, 30, 1 A.2d 775, 783 (1938).
55 Business and Economic Conditions, First National City Bank of New York, 1958.
56 National Dairy Products Corp. reported sales of $1,605,725,000 for 1959 and an Increase in
net earnings for the eighth consecutive year. Pittsburgh Post Gazette, March 22, 1960.
57 Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Te

Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936) (Differential allowed only to existing dealers).
58 Abbotts Dairies, Inc., v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372, 375 (1954).
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IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS
In the quarter of a century since the inception of milk control,
there have been three distinctly different periods of economic conditions and marketing problems. During the thirties, the prime
objective was to alleviate the depression and to raise milk prices
from depression levels. Shortages and nationwide price controls
dominated the milk marketing scene during World War II. The
postwar period has been identified by rising commodity prices,
the growth of interstate milksheds, the expansion of nationwide
dairy corporations and the continuing problem of a milk surplus.
The preamble of the Louisiana Orderly Marketing Law of 1958
illustrates this change in emphasis:
Whereas it is the intent of the legislature to prevent
the economic destruction of many dairy farmers, dairy
plants, ice cream dealers and resale merchants as a result
of discriminatory trade practices by certain business organizations financially strong enough to sell below their own
costs for an extended period of time which presents a situation detrimental to the health, welfare and economy of the
people of this state

. . .

9

While the Louisiana act provides for the control of farm prices
when requested by at least fifty percent of the producers in a given
market, the bulk of the statute regulates the resale practices of
discount rebates, advertising costs, free storage and refrigeration
equipment supplied to retailers and other similar trade practices.
Highly competitive practices6" in the wholesale and retail aspects
of milk distribution have forced other state commissions to regulate
such competition along with price controls. New York State has
attempted to control competition by limiting the number of dealer
licenses in areas where it is shown "that the issuance of a license
will lead to destructive competition in a market adequately served,"
or where the issuance of the license "is not in the public interest."6 1
In Shearer's Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated:
* * *Although governmental price fixing and its concomitants may run counter to the philosophy of free enterprise, it has been firmly established in relation to milk for
over a quarter of a century; that milk control is founded
upon price control; and that to maintain an established
price, it is necessary to prevent the seller from giving to the
purchaser any thing of value related to the sale, which is
in addition to the product and service for which the price
was established. (Emphasis added.) 62
As federal marketing orders under the agricultural adjustment
acts are limited to minimum producer prices, trade practices between processor and retailer are regulated primarily at the state
level.
59 La. Code Ann., rif.40 1 940.1, (Supp. 1959). This statute was upheld in Schwegmann Bros. v.
McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606 (1959). See also Cal. Agri. Code
4 3 6 0 (6).
60 In one area of Pennsylvania advertising costs for nineteen dealers according to the dealers
own exhibit totaled $1,388,274.00. Dealers Exhibit 2, Milk Control Commission Hearings February
10, 1960, Pittsburgh, Pa.
61 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21, 258 (c) (1954). See also Grimstead v. Carey, 150 N.Y.2d 657
(1956); Friendship Dairies v. DuMond, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (1954).
62 191 Pa. Super. 574, 576, 159 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1960). See also Milk Maid Dairy Products, Inc.
v. Milk Control Comm'n, 190 Pa. Supe', 410, 154 A.2d 274 (1959).
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From the standpoint of the producer, there is the traditional
agricultural problem of maintaining a balance between supply and
demand. Despite improved methods of breeding to equalize the
flow of milk, spring overproduction continues to be a factor in
decreasing the producer's return. Many states like Pennsylvania
have attempted to discourage seasonal flooding of the market by
a decrease in prices for these months. However, an attempt by the
New Jersey milk director to impose a production-controlling "norm
and excess" plan upon producers and dealers under the guise of
price control was held by the
63 New Jersey Supreme Court to be
beyond his statutory power.
Even more threatening to the dairy farmer are the changing
habits of milk consumption. While total consumption of milk has
increased, the sales of cream and premium fluid milk with a high
butterfat content have declined.6 4 The July report of the United
States Department of Agriculture shows a spring-time increase of
eight percent over 1959 in the sale of skim milk. The increased
sales of fortified skim and new low fat products can reduce producer "blend" prices based on butterfat content. Furthermore,
many states have adulterated-milk statutes which specifically define the butterfat content of fluid milk and prohibit the sale of
such low fat products. 65 The paradoxical questibn of when milk
is "milk" may have to be pesolved by either state legislative bodies
or the courts through the interpretation of adulterated-milk statutes.
The United States Department of Agriculture reports that
during the period 1956-1959, the traditional pattern of milk distribution has shifted from the quart to multiple-quart containers, and
from home delivery to retail sales outlets, with resulting price
differentials. In Safeway Stores v. Milk Comm'n, Justice Spratley
attempted to distinguish between a "legal" and an "illegal" price
differential as follows:
The words "grade, quantity, or class" .....

permit clas-

sification of milk according to "grade, quantity or class."
They do not permit classification according to the method
of distribution; i.e., whether by home-delivery or storedelivery. The quality of the milk of a particular grade
or class is not affected merely by reason of the method of
delivery,
the character of its container, or the quantity in66
volved.
A discount based on quantity is not a price differential
based on grade such as is prohibited. The price is the same
for the same grade in any quantity involved. A differential
.measured by quantity results in no discrimination between
distributors or between consumers. It applies to all alike,
and allows an economic saving both to seller and purchaser.6
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in American Can
Co. v. Milk Control Bd stated that minimum prices should take into
63 Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super
64Smith and Hermann, Changing Patterns in Fluid
65 The Act of June 8, 1911, P.L. 712, as amended,
that it is unlawful to sell milk "which contains less
of butter fat" except that "...
not more than one
may be sold, if sold as skimmed milk".
66 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1955).
67 Id. at 774.

285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
Milk Distribution, U.S.D.A., p. 1. (Aug. 1956).
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 31 1 521 (1958), provides
than three and one quarter (31/4) per centum
half (1/2) of one (1) per centum of butter fat
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account not only the kind or quality of the product sold, "but the
entire service rendered by the seller in making the sale, so that a
higher minimum price can be fixed for milk that is delivered at the
residence of the buyer."' 8 (emphasis added). While there has been
no litigation on this question, price differentials between home and
store purchases exist in Pennsylvania and many other states.
Quantity discounts for purchases of two or more quarts have
been upheld in Montana subject to the price standard based on
producer prices of Montana's statute 9 and
70 such discounts are included within the California statute itself.
A California court found that a price differential based upon
glass versus paper containers violated the state milk-control law of
that state.7'1 A recent California decision, however, held that the
packaging costs of the cheapest carton could not be used to determine minimum prices, but that the commission would have to
consider packaging costs of representative distributors.7 2 A recent
New Jersey case upheld the legality of the gallon jug as a container
for milk distribution.7 3 Recent hearings before the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission in the Philadelphia area have revolved
around the validity of a price differential based on this method of
distribution.
Classification of milk by butterfat content has been the usual
74
practice under most state control laws.

However, attempts to

establish separate prices for milk from Guernsey cows as opposed
to other types of milk have been held to be unreasonable.75 Originally, milk containing Vitamin A was classified by dealers as a
premium product. While this is still true in many states, the infinitesimal cost of these additives, considerably less than a half cent
per quart, has raised questions on the validity of such differentials.7 6
The city attorneys of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have repeatedly
raised this question in hearings before the Pennsylvania Milk Commission. Recently the Director of the New Jersey
Office of Milk
77
Industry eliminated this practice in the state.
Where a specific exemption does not exist, any governmental
institution, including federal agencies, 78 are subject to the state
minimum-price orders. Some price control statutes, however, specifically exempt certain governmental corporations and charitable
institutions.79 In other states, the commission or administrator may
establish a separate classification and price differential.80 As milk
is required under the federal school lunch program, the cost of this
product may often determine the scope and quantity of other food
68 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453, 454 (1944).
69 Heimbichner v. Montana Milk Control Board, 134 Mt. 366, 332 P.2d 922 (1958).
70 Col. Agri. Code § 4357.
71 Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n. v. Parker, 23 Col. 2d 137, 142 P.2d 737, (1943); Amer. Can
Co. v. Milk Control Board, 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453 (1944).
72 Sentell v. Jacobsen, 163 Col. 2d 748, 329 P.2d 932 (1958).
73 Pied Piper Super Market v. Hoffman, 160 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1960).
74 State v. Farmers Union Co-op., 160 Ore. 205, 84 P.2d 471 (1938).
75 New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op. v. Wickard, 141 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1944); Weiss v.
Milk Control Comm'n 71 Douph. 33 (Dauphin Co. C. P. Ct. 1957).
76 New Jersey Office of Milk Industry Order No. 60-1: .
For a period of years this office has
authorized a differential of one cent per quart over regular milk prices to be charged for milk
containing Vitamin D. The testimony . . . indicates that the costs of the additive are olmost negligible. I,therefore, find that the Vitamin D differential is not justified".
77 Ibid.
78 Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n 318 U.S. 261 (1943). Cf. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v.
Dept. of Agriculture of Cal. 318 U.S. 285 11943).
79 See State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
80 New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
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items. For this reason the City Solicitor of Philadelphia, in a milkprice hearing in June, 1960,81 specifically requested that school milk
be specially classified as a decontrolled item under the Pennsylvania
law. In a recent California case, 2 the court found that a reduction
in price to schools of noncontrolled dairy products, by a dealer
selling school milk, was not a violation of price control as "such
sales were severable," even though the total transaction actually
represented a reduction in price.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are many who advocate elimination of state milk pricing
agencies and the return to free competitive markets. Conversely,
there are advocates of state control laws in free market states. The
milk industry is unique in that it includes big and little business,
farmer and processor, economic giants and dwarfs, all involved in
a product subject to health hazards and vital to the urban consumer. Perhaps such a maelstrom of conflicting interests requires
a referee in the form of a state commission or administrator to
arbitrate the demands of each group.
In states where retail milk prices are regulated, urban consumers are interested parties. The municipal solicitor, with his
growing experience before other regulatory agencies, appears to
have a logical role in milk price proceedings. Traditional municipal
regulation of the sanitary aspect of the production and distribution
of milk sets a precedent for municipal interest in this field. As dealers and producers organize into trade lobbies and associations with
full time, able counsel, it is only equitable that the urban resident
also have adequate legal representation.
Appendix A
Alabama Code Ann., Tit. 22, Sec. 205 (1941 Supp. 1955).
California Ag. Code Ann., C. 17, Sec. 4200 (1954 Supp. 1959).
Florida Stat. Ann., Tit. 31, Sec. 501.01 (1943 Supp. 1959).
Georgia Code Ann., C. 42, Sec. 523 (1957).
Louisiana Code Ann., Tit. 40, Sec. 940.1 (1951 Supp. 1959).
Maine, C. 33, Sec. 1 (1954).
Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., C. 94A, Sec. 21 (1954).
Montana Rev. Code Ann., Sec. 27-401 (1947).
Nevada Rev. Stat., Tit. 51, Sec. 584-315 (1959).
New Hampshire Rev. Stat., Tit. XIV, Sec. 183 (1955).
New Jersey Stat. Ann., Tit. 4, Sec. 12-A (1959).
New York Consol. Laws, Art. 21, Sec. 252 (1954).
North Carolina Gen. Stat. Ann., Sec. 106-260 (1952 Supp. 1959).
Pennsylvania Stat. Ann., Tit. 31, Sec. 700-j-101 et seq (1958).
Rhode Island Gen. Laws, Sec. 21-4-1 (1956).
South Carolina Code Ann., Tit. 32, Sec. 1610 (1952 Supp. 1959).
Virginia Code Ann., C. 17, Sec. 3-346 (1950).
Vermont Stat. Ann., Tit. 6, C. 147, Sec. 2501 (1958).
81 Milk Commission Hearings, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 6 et seq 1960.
82 Jacobsen v. Dairy Mart Farms, Inc., 154 Cal. 2d 287, 315 P.2d 932 (1957).
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School in 1939. In 1945, he became Secretary to the Industrial
Commission of Ohio and was appointed Executive Secretary to Governor Lausche in 1946.

Collusive bidding practices are a real and ever-present problem
facing local, state and federal governments. On the federal or state
levels, the governmental units have at their disposal a large body of
comparative figures that focuses attention on instances when collusion among the bidders is likely to be present. Local governmental
subdivisions usually lack the necessary investigative staff to make
them aware of collusion among bidders.
Collusion may take many forms. Recently the federal government returned indictments against five electrical companies which
disclosed "rigged" bidding, principally among suppliers to municipalities. The indictments alleged that they conspired to share local
government business on a fixed percentage basis, and that they connived and bid at certain fixed amounts so that predetermined percentages would be realized. To achieve this result, one group of
conspirators met thirty-five times. To effect the scheme, or formula,
for quoting nearly identical prices to electric utility companies and
others, a cyclic, rotating, positioning formula was employed whereby one defendant manufacturer would quote the low price, other
defendant companies would quote intermediate prices, and others
would quote high prices. These positions would be periodically
rotated among the manufacturers. With reference to these matters,
purchases in the city of Cleveland within the past twelve months
total $94,961.00. Assuming that other municipalities, counties,
townships, school boards, and the state governments have been
similarly duped, the magnitude of the problem becomes self-evident.
It is apparent that such rotation would preclude a local government's awareness of the collusion inasmuch as the entire country
figures in the rotation and because all of the bids would vary somewhat under the formula submitted. Not all collusive bidders, however, can take such precautions against discovery.
Probably the most apparent cases of collusive bidding are those
in which all bids received are identical except for one, which is
slightly lower. This immediately throws up a red flag for the alert
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purchasing agent, director of a department, or anyone who is directly responsible for the purchasing of the specific items being bid
upon. Identical bidding, however, is not proof, in and of itself, that
there has been collusion in entering bids.
If the product is such that there is a leader in the field, and
others follow the leader without collusion, identical bids mean little
as proof of collusion. If there is but one supplier, and all bidders use
cost plus a commonly recognized percentage of profit, there certainly is no collusion. The problem, of course, is the ability to recognize
collusive bids as they appear.
In the city of Cleveland, a superficial survey disclosed that in
the period of one year, purchases amounting to over one-half million dollars were made in cases where all bidders submitted identical bids. This figure does not include bids which are identical but
for the one low bid.
One of the practices that gives impetus to identical bids is
rotating the award of contracts, i. e., when all bids are identical
the award is made to one other than the last successful bidder for
that particular product. Of course in this situation, the bidders know
that if they submit identical bids, a certain rotation will be followed.
If they are satisfied with an award on that particular product when
this "turn" comes up, the governmental unit has unwittingly assisted
the operation of collusion, though it was attempting to do only what
was fair under the circumstances. A possible solution is for the
award to be made to the last successful bidder if all bids are identical.
Generally, in order to prevent the evil of collusion between officials and suppliers, governments require sealed bids and further
require that the award be given to the lowest and best, or, the
lowest responsible bidder. These requirements have made collusive
bidding to governmental subdivisions feasible and attractive to the
bidders. Admittedly, the bid requirements cannot be removed or
even greater evils will result. However, when the bidders know
that the lowest bid, generally speaking, will get the award, even
though at a figure higher than is justified by the market, collusion
is a tempting means for making a sure profit.
How can such practices be prevented short of court proceedings
after lengthy investigations that probably could not produce enough
evidence if conducted by local independent governmental units?
If case law or statute permit, rejection of all bids is one possibility. Rejection however, can work an even greater pecuniary loss
to the governmental subdivision than collusion. If the product is
needed immediately, as is often the case, rejection of all bids may
introduce a costly and time consuming delay. Query: (1) Should
the law provide that where bids are identical, public auction may
be made upon the opening of bids, the lowest then receiving the
award? (2) Should the award be made one, two, or three weeks
later, thus permitting others to bid below the identical bids? (3)
Should a coin be tossed to select the successful bidder?
Some formula to discourage identical bids is certainly needed.
The purpose of sealed bids, and awards being made to the lowest
and best, is to achieve true competitive bidding. The law in this
field, as in all other fields, must change with the changing times.
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Rather than penal statutes, the need seems to be for law which will
forestall the occurence.
In the early part of this year, the city of Cleveland asked for
bids on items having two sources of supply. Four bidders submitted
identical bids of $60,120.00. Each of the bidders was then asked to
have a representative appear at a meeting with the Director of Law
where they were asked, quite frankly, "How could four bidders return identical bids on a contract of this size?" The reply was that
each, without collusion with the others, added a certain percentage
to the cost from the manufacturer and thus identical bids resulted.
All bids were rejected. Upon readvertising, the same companies bid
again. The bids were no longer identical and, on these bids, the city
did realize a saving. If the Department of Law had not taken the
initiative, this saving would never have been realized nor would
this irksome practice, at least in this instance, have been stopped.
Fortunately, in this case the material was not urgently needed.
The boldness of some bidders can be seen by the following
examples of bids received by the city of Cleveland, within one year:
Load Break Oil Switches - 4 bids
(identical)
$ 4,869.00
Rock Sale - 2 bids
(identical)
248,000.00
Fuse Cutouts (1000) - 5 bids
(identical)
13,500.00
Lightning Arresters - 5 bids
(4)
$976.20;
(1)
976.80
Anhydrous Ferric Chloride (800 T.) 2 bids
(identical)
64,000.00
Sodium Silico Fluoride (250 T.) - 7 bids
Minimum Delivery 25 T.
(identical)
34,350.00
Minimum Delivery 18 T.
(identical)
34,700.00
Cable, 10,000 Ft. - 5 bids
(identical)
13,320.00
Cable
- 5 bids;
(4)
$9,455.00;
(1)
9,395.00
Cable
- 5 bids
(identical)
13,970.00
Cable
- 5 bids;
(4)
$8,462.00;
(1)
8,742.00
Cable
- 5 bids
(identical)
67,520.00
One request or bids covering twenty items of fiber conduit was
conditioned upon the bid being broken down per item after which
there was response from four bidders. Items ran from $10.50 for 50
fiber caps to $11,000.00 for conduit. Three of the bidders were identical to the penny on each and every item. The fourth bidder was low
on each and every item by 1/2 of 1%.
It is inconceivable that such a large total of unvarying bids on
such varied articles of merchandise would have been presented by a
number of separate bidders if the healthy interplay of competition
were present. It is reasonable to assume that when two or more
suppliers bid the same dollar figure, the municipality or other governmental body is not receiving a dollar's worth of merchandise for
each dollar spent.
Scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence in the federal cases
should be of significant advantage to local governments. In the event
that the government is successful in convicting the defendants, the
municipalities that purchase from them will then have a cause of
action in treble damages.'
The public spotlight must be placed upon organizations which
1 15 U.S.C.A., § 15.
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insist upon thwarting the spirit and the law of competitive bidding.
Most states have some form of legislation prohibiting collusive bidding or statutes prohibiting agreements in restraint of trade, but
proof of an agreement in restraint of trade is difficult to obtain. The
problem should be tackled by making it unprofitable or unfeasible
on a local level to enter into such agreements.
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Among the most critical problems facing government at every
level today is that of transporting masses of people in and out,
through and around, great urban centers. Actually, the problem is
not as much one of transportation as it is a problem of movement
of people. The sometime conflicting interests of freight carriers and
passenger carriers can create political and economic obstacles to a
rational solution. It is therefore suggested that to properly focus
attention on this problem, we should refer to it as the need for improved passenger service. Viewed in this sense, the question is how
can we achieve the best passenger service at the lowest cost.
We live in an increasingly urban civilization. Since World War
II, the population shift from rural to urban areas has accelerated
markedly. Moreover, there is a second contributory cause to the increasing expansion of urban areas. This is the exodus of the city
dwellers into the suburban area, popularly known as the "exurbanite movement." By 1975, it is estimated that 80 per cent of our
nation's inhabitants - some 215,000,000 people - will be concentrated
in perhaps 160 urban centers.
This complicated, interdependent and interrelated pattern of
living requires an adequate system of transportation. Such a transportation system is no less than the very circulatory system of the
body politic. If, therefore, our metropolitan centers are not to be
strangled to death, but if, on the contrary, they are to continue to
grow to meet the needs of the surrounding urban communities which
are dependent upon them, we must ward off an impending coronary
attack in the form of urban traffic congestion.
Exclusive reliance upon private transportation, chiefly by the
passenger automobile, is foolish indeed. Imagine an estimated one
hundred million automobiles concentrated in 160 metropolitan areas
in 1975. The country simply cannot devote sufficient land in its
urban centers to accommodate such a tidal wave of automobiles.
There is no alternative but to dedicate the country's efforts to, and
concentrate our national resources on, mass transportation media.
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Should we fail to do so, the consequences to the nation will be nothing less than disastrous. The economic effect in terms of sheer waste
of existing capital resources and of the reduction of the level of the
flow of commerce alone is staggering to the imagination.
Philadelphia's recent efforts to solve its transportation problem
may point the way for other municipalities. In 1956, Mayor Dilworth
requested the City Solicator to take immediate action to implement
the recommendations of the City's Urban Traffic and Transportation
Board, a committee comprised of leading financiers, industrialists
transportation experts, labor leaders, and other civic minded citizens. While these proposals included the unification and coordination
of all public transportation facilities in the Philadelphia area, primary emphasis was placed upon the expansion of railroad commuter
passenger service.
One of the first and foremost objectives of any transportation
program is the improvement and expansion of the available mass
transit facilities, especially those which provide commuter service.
In Philadelphia, it is the railroads which offer, we believe, the
greatest potential for supplying commuter needs.
Fortunately, Philadelphia is alreadv supplied with perhaps the
finest basic network of mass transit facilities in the nation - 15 railroad lines traversing every section of the city and connecting the city
with each of the surrounding counties. These supplement our citywide rapid transit system of subways, elevated trains, street cars
and buses. However, as the studies of the Board showed, passenger
operations over these railroads had become inadequate for present
needs, and what is worse, were declining with ever accelerating
Sneed. As the number of users declined, so also did revenues. The
railroads' response was two-fold: (1) to curtail train service, and
(2) to raise rates. But, raising the cost of passencer fares and deteriorating both the frequency and quality of passenger service succeeded only in driving more of the traveling public from using the
railroads.
On behalf of the city and its 2,000,000 residents. the City Solicitor repeatedly resorted to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the federal and
state courtc: to try to halt the wave of train curtailments and fare
increases. But such efforts at best proved to be only a stopgap.
Certainly, in view of the passage of the Transportation Act of 1958,'
unilateral action to resist service abandonments and rate increases
is doomed to fail.
1 The relevant provision of the Transportation Act of August 12, 1958, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C.A.
13A, are:
(1) . . . carriers . . . if their rights with rsp'ct to the discontinuance or change, in whole
or in ort, of the operation or service of ny train . .. operatina from a point in one State
to a point in any other State . . . cre subject to any provision of the constitution or statutes
of any State or any regulation or order of (cre the subject of any proceeding Pending
before) any court . . . or regulatory agency of any State. may. . . . file with the Commission . . . notice at least 30 days in advance of any such proposed discontinuance or chanae.
Th . * * carriers filing such notice may discontinue or change any such operation or service
pursuant to such notice except as otherwise ordered by the Commission ....
Upon filing of
such notice the Commission shall have authority . . . to enter upon an investigation of the
proposed discontinuance or change. Upon the institution of such investigation the Commission, . . . at least 10 days prior to the day on which such discontinuance or change would
otherwise become effective, may require such train ...
to be continued in operation . . .
pending hearing and decision in such investigaton, but not for a longer period than 4 months
beyond the date when such discontinuance or change would otherwise become effective. If,
* . . the Commission finds that the operation or service of such trains . . . is required by
public convenience and necessity and will not unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce
the Commission may by order require the continuance or restoration of operation or service
of such train . . . for a period not to exceed one year . . . . On the expiration of an

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST

1960

Accordingly, by 1958, the City Solicitor had concluded and
therefore advised Mayor Dilworth that the mass transportation
problem could not be solved by fighting to keep trains on the
tracks. Instead, it was suggested that the city ought to cooperate
with the railroads, and, by negotiating a series of agreements, develop a broad, comprehensive and long range program. The basic
objectives of these agreements would be to maintain existing service, add additional trains where appropriate, reduce fares, and coordinate with the railroad, local bus and street car services.
After months of negotiations, an agreement was successfully
concluded with our two local railroad carriers, the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company and the Reading Company. For the sum of
$320,000, the estimated out-of-pocket cost, the railroads operated for
a 12 month period aproximately one-third more trains on their lines
serving the northwestern section of the city at fares reduced on
the average of 40 per cent.
At the same time, local bus service was tied-in, also at reduced
fares. This bus service was made available at both ends of the railroad trip and featured a loop bus to take passengers to downtown
offices at a 10 cent fare. Thus, for a total of 50 cents, a person could
ride a bus to the station, take a train to the terminal, and go by bus
again to his office. This bargain, if taken advantage of by the average commuter for a year, would save him about $250, not counting
the savings on wear and tear to frazzled nerves caused by driving
in bumper-to-bumper traffic. Such, then, is "Operation Northwest."
The success of this project in increasing the use of commuter
trains by over 30 per cent and correspondingly decreasing the use
of the passenger automobiles for daily trips into the center of town,
has exceeded all expectations. So encouraging were these results
that last September a similar agreement was executed with the
Reading Company for additional service over its lines serving northeastern Philadelphia. There is one essential difference for "Operation Northeast." While the city is paying the Reading Company
$105,000 for a 33 week experimental period, it retains all fares collected on the additional trains. Thus, in effect, the citizens of the
northeast are direct partners with the city in this venture.
So far, the passenger statistics of "Operation Northeast" can
be described as "phenomenal." The latest figures show that the number of passengers carried by Reading trains on this line has more
than quadrupled. Revenues have virtually tripled. What is more,
market research has revealed that if other improvements besides
increased service and lower fares were provided, the success of
these pilot projects would be even more startling. As it is, there are
about 2,000 automobiles less per day in the stream of center city
traffic.
order by the Commission after such investigation requiring the continuance or restoration of
operation or service, the jurisdiction of any State as to such discontinuance or change shall
no longer be superseded

. ...

(2) Where the discontinuane . . . by . • . carriers . . . of the operation or service of any
train operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State is prohibited by . . . any
State or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall . . . not have acted
finally on . . . an application . . . within 120 days from the presentation thereof, . . such
• . . carriers may petition the Commission for authority to effect such discontinuance or
change. The Commission may grant such authority only after full hearing and upon findings
by it that (a) the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or change . . . and (b) the continued operation or service of such train . . . without
discontinuance or change . . . will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate
operations of such . . . carriers or upon interstate commerce . . ..
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Thus, for a modest expenditure of approximately $500,000 per
year, the city has undertaken two experiments which have proved
that there can be a solution to the mass transportation problem.
The City of Philadelphia has moved toward a permanent solution of this problem. Upon thorough consideration and at the
conclusion of negotiations among city officials, civic leaders, railroad executives and union officials, a non-profit corporation has
been formed to administer the Philadelphia Plan. For the first time,
an agency has been created whose directorate includes representatives of the government, public at large, the railroads, and the railroad unions, each of whom has a direct stake in the successful solution of this problem.
This corporation, entitled Passenger Service Improvement Corporation of Philadelphia, is headed by a board of fifteen directors. Of
these, two are members of the mayor's cabinet, two are members
of the city council, seven are civic leaders unconnected with the city,
two are railroad officials (one each 5elected by the Pennsylvania
and the Reading), and two are union officials selected by the Railway Labor Executives' Association. The Passenger Service Improvement Corporation is intended to do exactly what its name implies improve passenger service. This corporation will negotiate contracts
with the railroads which will provide not only for the continuation
of Operations Northwest and Northeast,
but also for operations on
2
three additional railroad lines.
The City Council of Philadelphia is presently considering the
basic legislation to carry out these plans. Substantial assurance of
the long range success of Passenger Service Improvement Corporation will be based to a large extent upon the passage of the legislation. The key factor is the introduction of substantial technological
improvements which, although requiring a large capital outlay,
will more than pay for themselves by permitting large scale operational economics and fostering increased patronage with attendant
larger revenues.
The most important of these improvements is the replacement
of obsolete equipment with modern streamlined cars which are
2 A bill authorizing a $2,700,000 loan has been introduced in city council. This will provide, on
a self-liquidating basis, the funds with which to make certain capital improvements, including a
"turn-around" at or near Tarresdale Station and the acquisition of a certain number of new passenger
cars. The "turn-around" is essential because it would make possible much more frequent service
between the center of the City of Philadelphia and its outlying northeast sections on the Pennsylvania
Railroad tracks without interfering with the Pennsylvania Railroad freight and passenger service between Philadelphia and New York.
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economical to operate and maintain. The average age of the passenger cars used for commuter service in Philadelphia is 281/2 years.
These old cars have high maintenance and operating costs. Elimination or reduction of these high costs will most feasibly be accomplished by the substitution of the new efficient equipment for the
old. Cost reduction is, however, but half of the answer. Revenue
must be increased; additional passengers must be won back to the
railroads. One of the major methods of attracting the commuter to
use the railroads is replacement of the inadequate "horse and buggy"
stations with modern, efficient ones having adequate parking space
and the relocation of these stations convenient to the new centers
of population.
In Philadelphia there are two downtown terminals. One serves
the Pennsylvania Railroad and the other the Reading Railroad. They
are approximately four blocks apart. Each receives a large number
of commuter trains a day. Each is a stub-end terminal. The increased
costs in maintenance and operation resulting from the backing up
and piling up of trains as they arrive in these terminals can well be
imagined. Technical studies already reveal that it is feasible to connect both terminals through an underground cut. Further, they
demonstrate that although such an improvement would be costly,
the principal and interest of the long term bonds which would be
necessary to pay for the capital improvement, would be more than
met by the annual savings in maintenance and operation. Passenger
service would be improved greatly. Trains could make a loop without stopping at either 16th Street or 12th Street and thus provide
safer, easier, faster and much more convenient service.
The critical question arises, however: How are new trains and
new stations to be provided? Because the railroads' passenger operations have long been operating "in the red" and the railroads have
had neither the incentive nor, we are told, the funds to invest in
passenger facilities, the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the passenger train deficit proposed public subsidies. But,
who is to provide these public funds? The urban transportation problem is not just a local affair. It extends beyond the bounds of any one
city and often beyond the limits of any one state. It concerns
municipalities, states and the federal government. Each level of
government must share the responsibility. In view of the limited
taxing power and fund-raising resources of municipalities and individual states, it seems clear that the federal government must help
finance any such large scale capital improvement program by means
of the extension of federal credit.
In Pennsylvania, for example, the state constitution provides
that no debt shall be created by or on behalf of the Commonwealth
except for highway purposes. "Highway purposes" would not include passenger trains and railroad stations. The financing power
of the City of Philadelphia is also severely restricted since the state
constitution limits Philadelphia's indebtedness to 13.5 per cent of
the most recent 10 year average of assessed valuation of real property within the city's limits. By recent calculation, Philadelphia's borrowing capacity is now $463,000,000. But, of this amount, only
$37,000,000 remains for new borrowing of which some $19,000,000
has already been committed.
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While the city is fortunate, as compared with many other
municipalities, in that self-sustaining loans, including the so-called
"revenue bond issues," are held not to be part of the city's debt for
purposes of the constitutional limitation, such loans must be approved by the voters. It could take as long as eight months before
money would be made available on this basis, and as long as two
years until the actual bonds are sold. Furthermore, attempts to float
bonds in the amount required might well prejudice the financing of
all municipal improvements by unduly raising the interest rate.
A far-sighted federal step in the right direction has been taken3
in a bill introduced by Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey.
Senator Williams' Bill, amends Section 701 of the Housing Act
of 1954 and Title II of the Housing Amendments of 1955 to assist
state and local governments and their public instrumentalities in
improving mass transportation service in metropolitan areas. The
Act makes available urban planning grants to municipalities in
order to encourage planning to determine transportation needs and
to coordinate and integrate the various elements of mass transportation systems in metropolitan areas.
Especially important are the public facility loan provisions of
the Act, whereby $100,000,000 in federal funds is made available at
low interest rates to local government units for financing the acquisition of facilities useful in improving mass transit and commuter
service in urban areas. A careful extension of federal credit will
assuredly prove to be a conservative and, indeed, successful financial
venture. Philadelphia has already used many millions of dollars of
city credit to finance public transportation facilities. The most recent is the $25,000,000 bond issue for the acquisition of new subwayelevated cars. The fact is that commitments have been performed
and interest and principal payments on these loans have consistently been met. Over the life of the loan, the users of the services themselves will repay the money advanced to acquire the new equipment
which they enjoy.
In emphasizing the need for efficient and economical railroad
passenger trains and other mass transit facilities which S-3278 is
designed to meet, we must not overlook the equally important need
for coordinating the transportation systems in urban areas and for
encouraging the formulation of comprehensive planning. The "urban
planning grants" feature of the Williams' legislation, therefore is
very desirable.
There will, of course, be legal, political and practical obstacles
that must be hurdled. A legal impediment which was successfully
overcome in the Philadelphia program is illustrated in the following:
On January 21, 1960, an application was presented to the Court of
Common Pleas No. 6, Philadelphia County, for a charter for the
Passenger Service Improvement Corporation of Philadelphia. At the
hearing on the application before President Judge Gerald F. Flood,
one contestant objected to one of the charter purposes, viz., "3. to
act as the management agent for the City of Philadelphia in connection with the operation and financing of passenger transportation facilities and rights." President Judge Flood overruled the ob3 .-3278.
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jections in a scholarly opinion which goes to the heart of the matter
and concisely disposes of the protest:
It is urged that it is beyond the power of the city to
participate in the activities of such a corporation or to use
it as its agent in any way or to lend its credit to any corporation ....

These arguments in our opinion are fully discussed

and answered in the opinion of Chief Justice Stern in the
case of McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264 (1948), in which
similar objections were made to the Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh created under the Parking Authority Law
of June 5, 1947, P. L. 458. In that case the Parking Authority
Law and the operation of the Pittsburgh Parking Authority
thereunder and the appropriation of funds to it by the City
of Pittsburgh were all sustained as being valid and constitutional. We think that the discussion in that case clearly
answers all the objections before us. Insofar as the matter
depends upon the city charter rather than an act of the
legislature such as the Parking Authority Law, we see no
distinction in the applicable principles.
Accordingly, the charter was granted and the corporation came
into being.
Imaginative efforts must now be made to make the passenger
service more and more attractive. In addition to providing streamlined, air-conditioned, well-lighted, clean cars, services should be
provided, e. g., supplying of periodicals and beverages. Whatever
can properly increase revenues should be done. This is especially
true with regard to the off-peak utilization of the costly facilities.
The municipal government should take steps to bring about a
staggering of hours not only of the municipal employees, but also
of the masses of white collar workers. This will help to "level off"
traffic during the peak hours. Local transit systems, such as the
one in Philadelphia, consisting of subways, elevated, trolley and
bus lines, should be coordinated into a single, efficient, speedy passenger transportation system. All structures and schedules should
be kept under constant study to meet changing needs. An illustration of this is the study now being made to tailor certain commuter
schedules to bring masses of workers into factories along the railroad lines for early morning shifts and to return workers leaving
their duties on the swing shift. These industrial excursions can be
run at reduced rates and reduced costs. A completely coordinated
and total war should be waged to the point of substantially increasing the revenues, and thereby cutting down the unit costs.
Providing a safe, speedy and attractive passenger service is as
essential today as supplying water, sewerage disposal and other
critically needed and essential municipal services.
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One of the most controversial and provocative fields of municipal law is the enforcement of sanctions against the recent inundation
of obscene literature. Since the rebirth in popularity of the inexpensive paper-back book, the material available to the average reader
has broadened in scope. New horizons in availability, circulation,
and costs have been attained through this media.' Unfortunately,
much of the new material contributes nothing of cultural value.
One may purchase anything from a copy of the Dead Sea Scrolls to
hard-core pornography at the local supermarket. While most of the
part-time distributors who sell books as an additional customer
service are extremely conscientious about the good taste and quality
of the books they sell, every metropolitan area has a group of book
vendors selling only paper-backs of the most offensive, vile, and
filthy types.2 These people represent a substantial danger and do
in fact damage the public commonweal.
The fundamental question, "what is obscene?" has challenged
English and American jurists. Early cases had to determine whether
there was such a thing as obscenity.
Apparently, the first reported English case involving obscenity
was aiudicated in 1663. 3 After a conflict of jurisdiction arose over
the subject matter between the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts, 4 it was determined that an indictment charging
obscenity in a common law court could be filed and was jurisdictionally proper. 5 In 1821, a crime of obscenity under the common law
was recognized in the United States in Commonwealth v. Holmes.6
Today, although the fact phenomenon called "obscenity" is recogn1 "The Boom in Paper Bound Books" - Fortune Magazine, Sept. 1953. 300 million paper-back
books were sold in 1953.
2 Report of New York State Joint Legislative Committee Studying the Publication and Dissemination of Obiectionable and Obscene Materials, Legislative Document No. 32 (March, 1956).
3 1 Keble 620 (K.B. 1663).
4The Queen v. Read, 11 Mod. 142 (Q.B. 1708).
5 Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789 (K.B. 1727).
6 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
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ized in American and international jurisprudence,7 it is evasive of
definition.
Attempting to define obscenity is to invite controversy ranging
from mere semantic quibbling to bitter ideological debate. The
definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary lacks any incisive or
lucid formula. 8 At best, it describes obscenity. This vague description has not substantially aided the appellate courts, 9 but the
general tenor of the Black dictionary definition has been reduced to
this rule of thumb: "Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests." 10
For the sake of discussion, it is to this definition that the writer
will resort. Then, by such definition, the question "What is
obscene?" becomes "What material deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest?". This is the question which must
ultimately be resolved by the trier of fact.
To guide the trier of fact in making his decision, the Supreme
Court of the United States would have him decide, "Whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest."1
At first blush, it would appear that the Supreme Court has
supplied a clear and workable rule for the guidance of the trier of
fact. The rule can certainly be justified in that it tends to negate
the whim, caprice and personal distaste of a given panel of jurors
or a judge. In actual application, however, the rule becomes less
workable than might be supposed from a reading of the definition.
Both the prosecution and defense must consider new evidentary
problems which arise from the use of the rule, especially in attempting to show what are the "contemporary community standards".
The question of proof in establishing contemporary community
standards arose in the case of Smith v. California12 because the trial
judge had disallowed evidence by defendant of expert testimony of
such standards.
Mr. Justice Frankfurther, in urging the inclusion of the expert
testimony, stated: "Unless we disbelieve that the literary, psychological or moral standards of a community can be made fruitful and
illuminating subjects of inquiry by those who give their life to such
7 Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 37 Stats. 1511; wherein over 50 nations joined together in an attempt to outlow pornoaraphy.
8 Black's Low Dictionory, West Publishing Compony, p. 1227 (1951). "Obscene - Offensive to
chastity of mind or to modesty, expressing or presenting to the mind or view something that delicacy,
purity, and decency forbids to be exposed; offensive to modesty, decency, or chastity; impure, unchaste, indecent, lewd; offensive to senses; repulsive; disgusting; foul; filthy; calculated to corrupt,
deprave, and debauch the morals of the people, to promote the violation of the law, of such character
as to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences; calcula.ed to lower
that standard which we regard as essential to civilization, as calculated, with the ordinary person to
deprave his morals or lead to impure purposes; licientious and libelous and tending to excite feelings
of an impure or unchaste character; having relation to sexual impurity; tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts; tending to corrupt the morals of youth or
to lower the standards of right and wrong especially as to the sexuaul relation."
9 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); New Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823 (1953). Compare: Bantam Books Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. 2d 47 (1953); and Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 101.
10 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Prurient in pertinent part is defined as "Itching;
longing, uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of
desire curiosity, or propensity, lewd. '
11 Ibid. Contrasted is the common law rule, first established in Regina v. Hicks, 3 Queens Bench
360 (1868), "The test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands
publications of this sort may fall."
12 4 LEd. 2d 205, 221 (1960).
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inquiries, it was violative of 'due process,' to exclude the constitutionally relevant evidence proffered in this case. ' 13 Thus, while it
would certainly appear that the trier of fact, selected from the
community at large, should possess the degree of intellectual sophistication sufficient to make him aware of what is and what is not
filthy and repugnant to the area where he lives, the question of
compelling the inclusion of evidence of contemporary community
standards under the rule may quickly arise.
Another problem of proof arose in the Smith case concerning
evidence of the subjective state of mind of a defendant. The defense
of "I don't read every book in my store" poses a genuine evidentiary
problem.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in Smith, writing for the majority, commented:
We might observe that it has been some time now since
the law viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual
state of a man's mind .... Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book can hardly be a necessary element
in proving its contents. The circumstances may warrant
the inference that he was aware of what the book contained,
14
despite his denial.
Briefly, two approaches to this problem are suggested. The first
approach concerns evidence of the type of books sold in the defendant's establishment. This would involve, in all probability, the taking of a large number of books from the premises for evidence. The
attendant dangers of an illegal seizure could conceivably arise.
The second approach involves the extrinsic nature of the publication itself which should satisfy the scienter element. In a recent
case 15 the Honorable Benjamin Gassman, writing for the Court of
Special Sessions of the City of New York, observed that "the evidence before us discloses that each of these four books is a paper
covered book," and that the descriptive sexual gusto of the language,
printed on the back cover, was geared "as an inducement to the
would-be buyer.' 17 He also noted that the books were priced at
five dollars each and contained between 60 and 176 pages. He
further opined:
It is a well-known fact that book publishers, in recent
13 Id. at 218.
14 Id. at 212.
15 People v. Schenkmon, 195 N.Y. Supp. 2d 570 (1959).
16 Id. at 575.
17 Id. at 576.
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years, resorted to publishing soft-covered books, in order
to broaden the market and to sell them at less than a dollar,
in some instances as low as 25 cents per book,

. . .

to make

the books available to those who could not afford to pay
the price for a hard-covered book. Certainly the defendants
possessed that knowledge. When, therefore, a paper-covered
book is sold by a bookseller for $5, can it be truthfully said
that he did not know that the sale was induced by the fact
that the book contained 'hard core pornography,' or, as
Judge Woolsey referred to it in the Ulysses case, as 'dirt for
dirt's sake.'
A bookseller may not shut his eyes to something he
should know, for then the claimed lack of knowledge is
a sham and should not be permitted to defeat the purpose
of a statute which seeks to outlaw traffic in obscene literature.1 8
It is submitted that scienter places an overly harsh burden on
the prosecution when the law would be better served by the use of
a constructive knowledge approach. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
Smith, proffered the following: "A bookseller may, of course, be
well aware of the nature of a book and its appeal without having
opened its cover, or, in any true sense, having knowledge of the
book."' 19 This approach can assist the court in ascertaining the true
state of the defendant's mind, without offending due process, or
hampering effective law enforcement.
Another unique phase of pornography prosecutions appears in
their treatment by appellate courts. In the initial trial under a
typical statute 20 the trier of fact is asked to determine whether the
defendant knowingly kept for sale obscene matter. He must ascertain the contemporary community standards and determine
whether the material is appealing to the prurient interest. On an
appeal from a conviction, some courts, troubled by the question, "Is
this material obscene?", will surrogate their own value judgments,
upset the finding and overturn a conviction. Their basis is that, as
a matter of law, the work is not obscene. This, of course, involves a
finding that the material is not a transgression of the standard of
the community where the offense is alleged to have occurred,
despite the fact that the jury who reside in such community have
found the material to be obscene, after being fully instructed as to
the applicable law. It would indeed require a degree of omniscience
for jurists, far removed from the community where the alleged
offense arose, to be attuned to the contemporary standards of such
community so closely that they can find that the community standards were not offended, although the jurors who live in the community found that the community standards were transgressed, 2'
l' Ibid.
19 Smith v. California, 4 L.Ed. 2d 205, 217 (1960).
writes, composes,
20 California Penal Code Section 311.3, provides: "Any person who wilfully ...
stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent
writing, paper, or book; or designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares ony obscene or indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, cases, or otherwise makes any obscene or indecent
figure . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
21 Mr. Justice Block in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New
York, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959), recognized this problem, when he stated in the concurring opinion:
"So far as I know, judges possess no special expertise providing special competency to set standards
and to supervise the private morals of the notion. In addition, the Justices of this Court seem especially unsuited to make the kind of value judgment - as to what movies are good or bad for local
communities . . . "

JULY-AUGUST

1960

DICTA

unless the reviewing court in effect is simply telling the offended
community that its standards of morality and decency are too high
and that it must lower its standards to the level appealed to by the
material involved.
The very basic factor that permeates enforcement of obsenity
ordinances or statutes is, of course, the immunities and guarantees
of free expression and the dissemination thereof..2 2 To keep inviolate
the right of free speech is indeed a salutary goal. Generally speaking, voluntary and assertive conduct by a human being is oriented
to the relating of the self to others. Words are merely one form of
the assertive conduct we speak of. It goes without saying that they
constitute a precious part of that which the Western World calls
"liberty".
Since, however, the rule of law, our safeguard of liberty, implies a well-cast die, patterned from value judgments of good social
conscience, into which human conduct must fit, so does it compel
conformity to certain types of expression. Obscenity is an example
of this. Due process does not render a sovereignty impotent to that
which is said. The Supreme Court has stated, after relating the
history of obscenity:
It is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the
First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . there is sufficiently con-

temporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was
outside the protection intended for speech and press ....
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance .... 'It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly23 outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'

In a profound sense, the liabilities of obscene expression are one
of the rare places wherein the value judgments of society are superimposed over the pen of an offender. Unlike advocacy of noxious
ideologies, which could remotely enrich the soil from which new
ideas might germinate, 24 obscenity is devoid of any value to be left
to posterity. It helps no one integrate his life into his legacy as a
human being.
Since salacious expression has no worth in our culture and
performs no social purpose, how then can it be any different than
other goods, wares, and merchandise deemed repugnant to the public welfare? The reason underlying the protection of free expression
is lacking. This writer submits that the mere fact that the commodity sold is in the form of a book should not grant it the substance
of free expression. The Supreme Court appears to avoid that line
of reasoning because it does not treat obscene writings as it does
other commodities and it will not permit placing upon the seller
22 Ex Porte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."
23 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-485, (1957).
24 American Communication Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400, (1950).
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of obscenity the same strict liability that is imposed upon the seller
of other commodities which, as with pornography, have an inherent
hazard or danger to the public. As a consequence, strict liability is
valid for some noxious commercial goods but not for others."
Advancing the commercial element one step further, one can
readily observe that a number of "unwholesome works" have been
copyrighted by the publisher, as was the fact in the Smith case.
This reduces the personal aspect of free speech to a vested property
right that can be bartered away. No one, except by permission of
the owner, may repeat the protected expressions and use the property.26 Certainly this is inconsistent with speech and its ebb and
flow into the world of ideas. Damming up the stream of thought
for profit unquestionably eradicates the fundamental purpose of
free expression. As summarized in Four Star Publications Inc. v.
Erbes27 "Publishers are subject to the general law as is any other
industry conducted for profit."
Today, prohibiting criminal obscenity has a vital urgency. The
flood of pornography represents a trend toward degenerating the
resolute purposes upon which this country was founded. Lewdness
and idleness are not crafts of a nation of growth and strength. Historically, they are found in a civilization that has started its downward cycle.
The impact of pornography on those of tender years has a
tragic effect. An example is the criminal activity of a youngster
who committed a serious
sex offense in New York. He got the idea
'28
from "Amboy Dukes.
The increase of delinquency among juveniles is clearly attributable, in part, to this literary filth. 29 Mr. David Riesman, in his work
"The Lonely Crowd ' 30 observed: ".

.

. the child is allowed to gird

himself for the battle of life in the small circle of light cast by his
reading lamp.... With widely increased literacy and extensive print
distribution, more and more people read messages not meant for
them."
In closing, it is submitted that for personal satisfaction Candide
need not have groveled in the dirt to find his "best of worlds" any
more than this country need search the trash can for tools to shape
its unfulfilled future.
25 Smith v. California, supra, at note 20.
26 Foy Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1931).
27 181 F. Supp. 483, 486 (1960).
28 Testimony of the Honorable James U. Mulholland, Justice of the Domestic Relations Court of
the City of N.w York, Reoort of the Select Committee on Pornographic Materials, H.R., 82nd Cong.,
2d Sess. p. 107 (May 12, 1952).
29 Id. at 100.
30 York University Press, New Haven, p. 91, 1950.
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ABATEMENT OF BUILDINGS AS PUBLIC NUISANCES
By A. C. VAN SOLEN
Anton C. Van Solen is Corporation
Counsel for the City of Seattle,
Washington. He attended the University of Washington Law School
and, in 1915, was admitted to the
Washington State Bar. He had a
private law practice 1916-17 and
served in the U.S. Air Force 191718. He entered the Seattle City
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since 1930. He was president of
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guished Public Service, 1957; and
is now a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Institute.
The power of public authorities, particularly municipal corporations, to order the destruction of a building without compensation
as a matter of public protection, has long been of interest to attorneys for municipal corporations, as the moving parties, and to
private practioners. It is my purpose here to suggest a manner
whereby the destruction of buildings deemed to be a public nuisance may be accomplished, without undue delay, under a valid
exercise of police power.
The line between the eminent domain provision of the Federal
Constitution requiring compensation for property taken for public
use and the proper exercise of the police power has rested on the
question as to whether there has been an appropriation, plus a taking. If these two elements exist there is a taking for which compensation must be awarded.1 If the element of appropriation is
missing, and there is merely a destruction for the public
welfare,
2
the police power of the state has been called into play.
It is not enough that a city say the destruction is necessary for
the public welfare, for not only must the ends be reasonable but the
means must be appropriate. 3 Further, procedural due process must
be satisfied to the extent that a citizen's property will not be subjected to the possibly arbitrary and irresponsible action of a group
of citizens4 or the city itself,! that the property owner be given
adequate notice, and that a full hearing be afforded.6
When faced with the problem as to how to safely proceed
toward the destruction of certain buildings without compensation as
a matter of public protection, the City of Seattle, Washington, first
brought a civil action seeking abatement by judicial process upon
1 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2
3
4
5

Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
See note 2 supra; cf., Eubank v. Richmond, 266 U.S. 137 (1924).
Nashville v. Weakley, 170 Tenn. 278, 95 S.W.2d 37 (1936).

6 Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1 (1938).

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST 1960

a finding of a public nuisance. This procedure proved to be impractical and was abandoned because it involved a title report, service of
process, establishment of jurisdiction, findings of fact, conclusions of
law, judgment, and an order of execution addressed to the sheriff
of the local county, who required a bond for his protection,-all of
which took, on the average, nine months to a year's time.
Now, the procedure for summary abatement in Seattle is as
follows: When the local legislative authority, upon petition or its
own motion, finds that a certain building is in such condition as to
be a danger to the public, a complaint is referred to the heads of
administrative departments of the city, particularly of the fire,
health and building departments, who are concerned with the public peace, health, safety and welfare of the citizens, to make findings
of fact as to the condition of the building and in what respects and
to what extent the public may be affected thereby. The findings are
transmitted back to the local legislative authority, which legislatively adopts such findings by specific ordinance and declares that
by reason of such facts the building constitutes a danger to the public and a nuisance and should be summarily abated, and provides for
notice to the property owner to correct the dangerous conditions
within a certain time. If the property owner fails to correct the
dangerous conditions, the administrative officer designated, usually
the chief of the fire department or the superintendent of buildings,
is authorized and directed to destroy the buildings.
In the past this procedure has involved little or no expense
to the city because the contractor employed by the administrative
officer did the work for the salvage. This is no longer practical and
the city has recently expended certain public moneys in connection
with the demolition which it has sought, without too much success,
to recover from the often absentee owner. This procedure is an
extreme remedy which is not often used but has not been challenged in the courts and in my opinion is lawful.
There has been at least judicial recognition of this procedure in
the state of Washington 7 and by way of dictum the court suggests
that if the officer involved acts under an appropriate ordinance, he
will not be personally liable because the doctrine of respondeat
superior applies even if it is found that the abatement was unlawful because no nuisance in fact existed, in which case the municipality is liable for taking or damaging under the state constitution.8 An interesting Colorado case in which the latter result was
reached is McMahon v. City of Telluride.9 The court reasoned that
since there was no nuisance to abate there must have been an
element of appropriation.' 0 Thus the building was deemed to have
been taken for public use and required the loss to the owner to be
compensated for by the municipality.
It is only under the auspices of emergency, grounded on the
imminence of harm, that a building may be demolished without
previous judicial or quasi-judicial process." If the property is in
fact a nuisance, the owner has no constitutional right to maintain it,
7
8
9
10
11

Hotel Cecil Co. v. City of Seattle, 104 Wash. 460, 177 Pac. 347 (1918).
Ibid.
79 Colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 (1926).
See note 1 supra.
E.g., Miller v. Valparaiso, 10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N.E. 418 (1893).
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and when that nuisance creates an imminent danger, a necessity
for immediate action arises. 12.
Although, one has no right to maintain his property as a public
nuisance, it is equally clear that he has a constitutional right to
have the fact of the nuisance determined in accordance with the due
process clause. A mere declaration by the city that a certain building is a nuisance is not tolerated."3 Without question, the general
rule is that, except in cases of immediate necessity, public authorities may not destroy a building without prior notice and a hearing
14
as provided by law, irrespective of the fact of an actual nuisance.
The same result has been reached when there has been a legislative
determination in advance as to what is a nuisance. 5
The limitations on the police power in this area are not wholly
unstaked. Buildings cannot be destroyed under this power merely
because they are unsightly and offend the aesthetic refinements of
the citizens.1 6 On the other hand, the emergency doctrine is given
broad application when there is a fire hazard. 17 If the building in fact
violates an ordinance setting fire limits, i.e., bounds within which
buildings of combustible materials cannot be erected, it is a nuisance
per se and the owner has no right to complain of summary action. 8
Another factor which enters into the reasonableness of a city
council's order to destroy is whether there is a more appropriate
means to remedy a nuisance than destruction. Generally speaking,
there may be a valid exercise of the police power by a state despite
an alternative means to accomplish the same end.' 9 However,
since the remedy here is extreme, the alternative means, e.g., reasonable alterations and repairs instead20of destruction, has been given special countenance by the courts.
In conclusion there remains only to be considered the question
whether the power and authority of municipal corporations in
the exercise of the police power to provide for abatement of buildings as public nuisances by destruction in the manner herein suggested and without liability if the nuisance in fact, exists, is augmented by laws relating to urban renewal. This question has
not, to the writer's knowledge, been a d d r e s s e d to or
passed on by the courts but, generally speaking, it would seem that
urban renewal laws do not change the questions of law and fact,
authority and liability above discussed, although such urban renewal laws do in many instances undertake to define "blight" in
such a manner as to purport to extend the powers of abatements by
destruction of buildings even if they are not in law or fact "public
nuisances."
12 Ibid.
13 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. ,497 (1870).
14 E.g., Lyons v. Prince, 281 N.Y. 557, 24 N.E.2d 466 (1939).
15 Nashville v. Weakley, 170 Tenn. 278, 95 S.W.2d 37 (1936).
16 E.g., Crossman v. Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923).
17 King v. Davenport, 98 III. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89 (1881). But see Bennington v. Hawk, 100 Vt.
37, 134 A. 638 (1926).
18 Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 81 (1950).
19 E.g., Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
20 State Fire Marshal v. Fitzpatrick, 149 Minn. 203, 183 N.W. 141 (1921), Iverson v. Keedick, 151
Neb. 802, 39 N.W.2d 797 (1949).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Probably no problem in Colorado is of greater importance than
the home-rule city.1 At a recent date there were twenty-two homerule cities in the state. 2 The number continues to increase. Until
4
3
recently only one of the larger cities was a "general statute" city.
The population growth in metropolitan areas since World War
II marks a revolutionary change in our national characteristics. The
problems arising from this population shift are wide and varied.
Local governments are hard pressed to meet the demands for additional municipal services and to meet the cost of defraying them.
The financial woes of municipalities, school districts, and other political subdivisions in heavily populated urban areas are commonplace.
Problems encountered in home-rule cities involve a wide range of
municipal matters.

II.

CONFLICTING THEORIES

OF GOVERNMENT

Home-rule is an outgrowth of a desire for independence, and
self-determination. As a general rule, a municipality is a creature of
*In the preparation of this paper, the author is indebted to the authors of a number of papers
and published articles, as well as to several of the attorneys in the firm in which he is a partner.
Particularly, the assistance of his partner, Thomas B. Faxon, should be noted.
1 Colo. Const., art. XX § 6, provides in part that, "The people of each city or town of this state,
are hereby vested with . . . power to make,
having a population of two thousand inhabitants ...
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend
to all its local and municipal matters."
2 Alamosa, Boulder, Canon City, Colorado Springs, Cortez, Craig, Delta, Denver, Durango, Englewood, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan, Grand Junction, Greeley, Lafayette, Littleton, Monte Vista, Montrose,
Pueblo, Sterling, Westminster and Wray.
3 Greeley.
4The rapid population growth in metropolitan Denver in the lost ten years has altered this
picture. Arvoda, Aurora, and Thornton have grown to become relatively large municipalities and
they are not home-rule cities.
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the legislature and has no inherent powers. This fundamental rule
has been expressed as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in,
or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation ....

Any fair, reasonable, sub-

stantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied.5
Further, courts generally adopt a rule of strict construction of
municipal powers to determine if there is any reasonable doubt
about the existence of a power and if it is actually non-existent. The
rationale for these rules of construction is that the legislature intended to grant only those powers which it expressly granted or
which are necessarily or incidentally implied. 6 Frequently, this
dependence upon a state legislature has been frustrating to large
numbers of persons in whom the drive for independence is strong.
Home-rule for municipalities has been practiced for many years,
both in this country and in England. One writer describes cities
in England having rights of home-rule prior to Magna Charta. The
5 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 1 237 (5th ed. 1911). To the same effect, see 2 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations HI 10.03-.12 (3d ed. 1949); 1 Jones, Bond and Bond Securities § 36 (4th ed.
1935); 1 Yokley, Municipal Corporations § 52 (1956); Rhyne, Municipal Low of 4-2, 4-7 (1957); 1
Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.01 (1958).
6 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 10.18-.19 (3d ed. 1949). See also I Dillon, Municipal
Corporations §§ 237-39 (5th ed. 1911); 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Low § 5.03 (1958); 1
Yokely, Municipal Corporations § 60 (1956).
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same writer cites the Great Charter of the City of London as granting powers of self-government. The earliest home rule provision in
this country, however,
dates from a constitutional amendment by
7
Missouri in 1875.
III. TYPES OF HOME-RULE
As is indicated above, there is considerable variation from state
to state in theories of home-rule. Some basic classification of the
theories is, however, possible.
There are two basic theories or approaches to the problems of
municipal home-rule power and legislative control. The "constitutional" or "self-executing" theory is that a municipality has all
powers over its local and municipal affairs.8 This extreme view followed in Arizona, California, Colorado and Oklahoma denies all
legislative control of municipal affairs, and invalidates legislative
acts on such matters even if there is no municipal legislation in
point.9 The more common, and less extreme, view results in the
invalidation of legislative acts affecting municipal affairs only when
the conflict is with a municipal charter or ordinance. 10
In the non-self-executing or "legislative" states, a municipality
is still dependent upon the state legislature for its powers. The
courts, however, generally adopt a rule of liberal construction in
their interpretations of legislation. Enabling acts are frequently required, although many of these acts constitute broad general grants
of power. In some jurisdictions special legislative charters are permitted."
Nevertheless, practically all jurisdictions, both "self-executing"
and "legislative" in theory, indicate that in matters not pertaining
solely to local and municipal matters, but which also are of "statewide concern," or "of general concern to the people of the state,"
municipal charters and ordinances are superseded when in conflict
with a legislative act. 12 Numerous problems exist as to what matters
are of state-wide concern, what constitutes a "conflict," and when
has the state "preempted" or "occupied the field." Although there
is a considerable body of case law distinguishing municipal affairs
from state affairs, no clear objective test emerges.
In distinguishing municipal affairs from state affairs, four broad
generalizations have been made. 13 First, if it appears that
uniform regulation of the matter in question is necessary or desirable for the state as a whole, the matter is usually found to be one
of state-wide concern. Secondly, historical considerations have some
effect in determining whether a particular subject is of local or statewide concern. Thirdly, and most important, is the relative effect of
the subject upon those people living outside the city in question. If
the effect of the matter is of minor significance to those urban
dwellers, the subject is usually deemed to be of local concern. The
courts, however, generally hold that a matter is of state concern if it
vitally affects many of those living outside the home-rule city. Finally, where uniformity as well as co-operation among many govern7
8
9
10
11
12
13

1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.00 (1958).
Id. 8 3.03.
Id. 6 3.14.
Id. § 3.15.
14. 4 308.
Id. 8 3.16.17.
Id. 9 3.36.
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mental units is necessary, and action of state and county officials is
required within the city to effectuate adequate protection outside
the city, the matter will most likely be considered to be of state-wide
concern. It is necessary for the courts to keep an open mind in
determining these questions and to avoid ruling in a particular way
merely because of precedents established many years before. The
courts should not hastily determine these questions, but should
thoroughly evaluate the effects upon the entire state, the people
living around the city, and those living within the city.
There are at least two "models" to which states can look for guidance as to home-rule theories and which express the divergent
theories suggested above. The National Municipal League (N.M.L.)
model was published in 1948 in the fourth edition of the Model State
Constitution. It sets forth the powers of home-rule municipalities in
broad general terms, with specific enumeration of certain powers,
without thereby limiting or restricting the general grant of municipal power. The legislature's power, however, to enact laws of statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city is not restricted.
The provision does create a self-executing imperium in imperio, a
realm of home-rule power in local and municipal affairs, partially
enumerated, which is not subject to legislative grace or tolerance.
This provision of the N.M.L. gives the municipalities a measure
of protection from a legislature controlled by the rural districts. The
provision is subject to the disadvantage that courts have a considerable burden in the case of conflicting state and municipal legislation
to decide
which matters are municipal affairs and which are state
14
affairs.
The model of the American Municipal Association (A.M.A.) was
printed in 1953 under the title Model Constitutional Provisions for
Municipal Home Rule. A home-rule city thereunder has a plenary
grant of powers in municipal affairs, effective without the aid of
enabling legislation except to the extent any power is not denied by
the city's charter, is not denied to all home-rule municipalities by
statute, and is within such limitations as may be established by
statute.
Unlike the theory in many "legislative" home-rule jurisdictions,
the existence of any power is not dependent upon an enabling act.
Nevertheless, a home-rule city is subject to control by the legislature - if the legislature affirmatively limits power without discrim14 Bromage, Home Rule - NML Model, 44 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 132 (1955).
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ination. The advantage of this model of the A.M.A. lies in the fact
that it avoids the necessity of repeated court determinations of what
constitute municipal affairs and what constitute general affairs,
determinations which place a considerable burden on the courts and
which have defied "reasonably predictable application because of its
(the distinction between municipal and state affairs) lack of a firm
rational core." The disadvantage, if it be such, is that, with certain
exceptions,"5 no home-rule power is beyond legislative control, even
in an area which almost any court would hold to be solely of local
and municipal concern.' 6

IV.

INCEPTION OF HOME-RULE IN COLORADO

The Colorado Supreme Court recently stated that in construing
a constitutional provision, "its particular meaning depends not alone
on definitions but also on the history of the amendment as a whole,
including the intent of the framers;17the context in which it appears,
together with the applicable facts.'
Local self-determination in Denver, among white settlers in
Cclorado, had its origin in the mining "districts" and the agricultural
and urban "claim-clubs," created as early as 1859 with the initial
gold rush in Colorado, and as late as 1880. Few, however, were
created after 1861 when the Colorado Territory was effectively
launched under federal authority, and few failed to surrender their
law-making and enforcement powers to territorial officials. These
"districts" and "claim-clubs," however, filled a vacuum existing between 1859 to 1861 and were in a real sense autonomous local governments operating without any legislative grants of power.'8
Denver was incorporated by a special act of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Colorado, entitled "An Act To Incorporate the City of Denver," adopted and approved on November 7,
1861. This act or charter was amended a number of times by subsequent sessions of territorial and state legislatures.
The author of the "Rush Amendment" to the Colorado Constitution, i.e., article XX, sometimes called the "home-rule amendment," wrote a book in which he describes the turbulent history of
the birth of home-rule in Colorado. 19 Many pages are devoted to the
tribulations leading to the sentiment that home-rule was necessary
to rescue control of the cities, particularly Denver, from the rurallycontrolled General Assembly. In the 1880's, the situation was such
that control of Denver was a political football. Many persons believed the City of Denver had been reduced to political serfdom.
So intolerable had conditions become that the people of Denver began to demand home-rule. A citizen's party managed to elect a nonpartisan mayor in 1895 and again in 1897; but he was defeated in
1899, allegedly by nefarious means.
Many charges of graft and coruption were hurled at the county
officials. Judge Ben B. Lindsey, then on the county bench, unearthed proof of these charges. Another source of irritation was the
15 The A.M.A. model restricts the state's legislative power as to municipal procedures by making
"chorter" provisions superior to statutes.
16 Fordhom, Home Rule - AMA Model, 44 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 137 (1955).
17 Board of Education v. Spurlin, 349 P.2d 357,361 (Colo. 1960).
18 Rogers, The Beginning of Law in Colorado, 36 Dictn 111 (1959).
19 Rush, The City-County Consolidated 328-32 (1940). This book is unfortunately relatively rare
and is not readily available.
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unequal taxation for the five different school districts which were
either wholly of partially within the
20 city limits of Denver. Attempts
to consolidate these districts failed.
Dissatisfaction was also expressed for the alleged mis-handling
of the city council's powers in awarding franchises to public utility
corporations. Corrupt bargaining was openly charged.
Several abortive attempts were made in 1898 and again in 1899
to correct these problems. In 1901, Mr. Rush, the author of the above
books, as a state senator introduced a bill for an amendment to the
constitution which would add article XX for purposes of creating a
City and County of Denver as a new political entity in the state. The
people and leading newspapers rallied to the support of the proposed amendment. On the other hand, the public utilities and other
newspapers came out in vicious opposition to the proposal. After a
bitter struggle, the legislature voted to submit the proposed amendment to a vote of the people in November of 1902. In that election,
the amendment carried by more than a two-to-one majority.
Immediately upon the amendment's going into effect in 1902, its
beneficial results became apparent. Taxes were materially reduced,
the dual set of officers was -eliminated, official responsibility was
was obviated and the governmental operfixed, conflict in authority
21
ations were simplified.

It seems equally clear, however, that the author of article XX
did not intend a home-rule city to be completely independent of the
state legislature. He stated in his book:
It seems clear ...

that the City and County of Denver

is a 'single body politic and corporate,' with one set of
officers to perform both city and county functions . . .
All that the legislature may do is to pass general laws
prescribing what acts and duties county officers must perform, but in no event has it any power to authorize the
governor or any other person to name a single one of such
officers. That was the deliberate purpose of the author in
drafting article XX so as to leave the legislature that limited
to the proper exercise of the sovereign
power necessary only
22
power of the state.
In Denver, pursuant to the constitutional amendment, the first
charter convention was elected and a proposed charter was framed
in 1903. The utility companies in Denver, however, voiced strong opposition to the charter. The proposed charter was not passed. A
second charter convention was elected, and the charter framed by
it was adopted by the electors on March 29, 1904. It was much like
the proposed charter of 1903. The provisions concerning the acquisition of privately-owned utilities by Denver were so burdensome and
complex that as a practical matter it was not feasible to follow them.
In 1917, the acquisition of the Denver Union Water Company
properties and water system was authorized by a separate charter
amendment.
The voters of Colorado Springs adopted a home-rule charter by
authority of article XX on May 11, 1909; Grand Junction, on Sep20 In re Senate Bill No. 9,26 Colo. 136, 56 Pac. 173 (1899); In re Senate Bill No. 23, 23 Colo.
499, 48 Pac. 647 (1897).
21 Rush, co cit. supra note 19, at 337, 339-40.
22 Id. at 351. (Emphasis Added).
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tember 14, 1909; and Pueblo, on July 28, 1911. These three cities and
Denver were the pioneers in home-rule in its first decade in Colorado.
V.

PROVISION OF ARTICLE XX

In summary, article XX as adopted in 1902, provided that the
"municipal corporation known as the city of Denver, and all municipal corporations and that part of . . . the county of Arapahoe ...

included within the exterior boundaries of the said city of Denver...
are hereby consolidated and are hereby declared to be a single body
politic and corporate, by the name of the 'City and County of Denver'." There follow several powers2 3 which are like those typically
granted by state legislatures to cities which are creatures of the
legislatures, e.g., the powers . . . to sue and defend, have a seal,

receive and manage gifts and bequests, acquire utilities and issue
bonds. It was provided that the united city and county should grow
as a unit under the general annexation statutes; and that the City
and County of Denver should alone constitute school district No. 1,
the school district to be governed under the general laws of the
state, with
automatic merger in the district of lands annexed to
24
Denver.
Article XX also provided that Denver's officers should be those
provided by charter, which should designate the officers to perform
acts and duties required by the constitution or general law, "as far
as applicable. '25 The amendment provided for the transfer of government and for interim officers. 26 Article XX stated that the people
of Denver "are hereby vested with and they shall always have the
exclusive power in the making, altering, revising or amending their
charter," and the taxpaying electors shall be elected to a charter
convention to draft a charter to be submitted to the people.2 7 No
franchise relating to any street, alley or public place of Denver can
be granted without the approval of taxpaying electors. The council
has the power to fix the rate of taxation on property each year for
2
city and county purposes.
A procedure was provided for the amend29
ment of a charter.
Section 6, article XX, before its amendment in 1912, provided
that cities of the first and second class in the state were empowered
to adopt charters and to have the same power as provided in article
XX.
The last section of article XX proides that "anything in the constitution of this state in conflict or inconsistent with the provision
of this amendment is hereby declared to be inapplicable to the matters and things by this amendment covered and provided for." 30
23 This article, in line with the language of the constitution and of most of the charters, speaks
of "powers" and "authority." Where, however, the question has been squarely presented, it aenerally has been held that the home-rule charters, as well as constitutional provisions, constitute limitations on power and are not in fact grants of power. Thus, it has been held that Article XX confers
upon the City and County of Denver all necessary powers in local and municipal matters which the
legislature could validly grant; and, unless otherwise limited, these powers may be exercised
through the legislative department of the city. Laverty v. Straub, 110 Colo. 311. 134 P.2d 208 (19431:
People ex rel. McQuaid v. Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 12 P.2d 349 (1932). See also Hawkins v. Hunt, 113
Colo. 468, 160 P.2d 357 (1945).
24 Colo. Const., art. XX, iI 1,7.
25 Colo. Const., art. XX, § 2.
26 Colo. Const., art. XX, § 3.
27 Colo. Const., art. XX.
4.
28 Colo. Const., art. XX, 11.
29 Colo. Const., art. XX, 5.
30 Colo. Const., art. XX, 8.
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VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE FIRST DECADE

Within a month after its adoption, article XX was under attack
in the courts. The tenor of Mr. Rush's remarks indicates that emotions ran high, that vitriolic remarks were publicly made, and that
intrigue and activity concerning
there was a great deal of political
31
Denver's home-rule powers.
On December 1, 1902, the newly-proclaimed treasurer of the
City and County of Denver demanded of the treasurer of the old
City of Denver, who refused to be displaced, that the latter give
him all moneys, records and property belonging to the office of city
treasurer. This demand was denied, and the new treasurer sought a
writ of mandamous commanding the transfer. The answer asserted
the unconstitutionality of the mode of amendment and of its substantive content. The final decision, in People v. Sours, 2 upheld
article XX in its entirety. This decision included a thirty-page opinion by Mr. Justice Steele, a separate concurring opinion, and a dissent by Mr. Justice Campbell which was as long as the majority
opinion.
In the court's opinion, Mr. Justice Steele wrote that "the amendment is to be considered as a whole in view of its expressed purpose
freedom from legislaof securing to the people of Denver absolute 33
tive interference in matters of local concern.
Then, in 1905, eight cases 34 arose involving the title to the
31
32
33
34

Rush, op. cit. supra note 19 at 341-51.
31 Colo. 369, 74 Poc. 167 (1903).
Id. at 387, 74 Pac. at 172.
People v. Johnson, 34 Colo. 143, 86 Pac. 233 (1905). The other seven cases follow in 34 Colo.
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offices in Denver of county judge, county assessor, county clerk and
recorder, treasurer, constable, sheriff, county commissioners and
justices of the peace. Fifteen hundred pages of briefs and arguments
were filed in the Colorado Supreme Court by a great bank of attorneys on each side.
The court held invalid the Denver charter provisions relative
to election and term of office of these persons who would perform
the "county" jobs in the home-rule city and county. These matters,
the court held, were governed by general statute.
This decision was in the face of section 2 of article XX of the
Colorado Constitution, which provided then, as it does today, that
"the officers of the City and County of Denver shall be such as by
appointment or election may be provided for by the charter; and
the jurisdiction, term of office and qualifications of all such officers
shall be such as in the Charter may be provided; but the charter
shall designate the officers who shall, respectively, perform the acts
and duties required of county officers to be done by the Constitution
or by the general law, as far as applicable."
Mr. Justice Steele and one other dissented, stating that it was
held in positive language in Sours, not only that the people could,
but that they had freed Denver from several provisions 35
of the constitution by making article XX a part of the constitution.
These eight cases relating to county officers were all overruled
six years later in the Cassiday36 case... Mr. Justice Steele's dissent
in the earlier "officer cases" was adopted in toto by the majority in
Cassiday. The court said in substance:
Article XX is as much a part of the constitution as
any other. There is provision (under section 2) clearly providing for the appoirtment and election of such officers
of the City and County of Denver as may be provided by
the Charter. There is no room for construction. There is in
Denver a county government and a city government, just as
in other portions of the state. There is no pretense in the
Charter of setting aside governmental duties as to state and
county affairs; the Charter, pursuant to the Constitution,
37
simply provides by whom the duties shall be performed.
While Cassiday was held to be a great victory for Denver, it
was followed by two cases in quick succession which again showed
an extremely restrictive attitude toward home-rule. In the first of
these,3 8 the court held that there was no authority vested in the City
and County of Denver to control and fix in any way the levy of
taxes for county purposes within its boundaries. This was apparently
directly contrary to article XX which expressly says "The council
shall have power to fix the rate of taxation on property each year
35 Id. at 188, 86 Pac. at 247. For an interesting sidelight involving contempt proceedings brought
against the publisher of a newspnoer which bitterlv criticized the Johnson case, see Peoole v. NewsTimes Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912 (1906), aff'd, sub non Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
•36People v. Cassiday, 50 Colo. 503, 117 Pac. 357 (1911). Cases intervening between the 1905
"officer cases" and Cossiday were: Glendenning v. The City and County of Denver, 50 Colo. 240,
114 Pac. 652 (1911); Keefe v. The People, 37 Cola. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906); City of Denver v. Hallett,
34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905).
3T Mr. Rush's remarks concerning she alleged "most astounding theft of the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of on entire state without parallel in history" during the period between the
dates the Sours and Cossiday decisions were rendered, as well as his rather vitriolic comments concerning a number of the judicial decisions rendered in that pecriod
and their authors, indicate considerable political turmoil. Rush, op. cif. supra note 19, at 344 et seq.
38 Hilts v. Markey, 52 Colo. 382, 122 Pac. 394 (1912).
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for city and county purposes." The court said however, that the
provision applied only to purposes of the consolidated unit. What is
meant by a "consolidated unit" is not clear. The case is unquestionably one difficult to understand. Then came the last straw. In the
Mauff 9 case, the selection of judges for municipal elections was held
to be a matter of state-wide concern on which there could be no
legislation by the people of Denver. Mr. Justice Teller said several
years later that "It is common knowledge that the decision [in
Mauff] was the moving
cause of the framing and initiating of the
0
Amendment of 1912."4
It was in November of 1912 that article XX was amended- to
add the forceful section 6. Reference is made to "Dillon's rule,"
stated above, 41 that a municipal corporation has only those powers
granted in express words, those necessarily or fairly implied in the
powers expressly granted, and those essential to the accomplishment
of the declared objects of the corDoration which are not merely convenient, but indispensable. So far, the Colorado Supreme Court,
at least some of the time, has made it clear that article XX completely freed the home-rule City of Denver from this mandate in local
and municipal matters.
The "reluctant" cases, however, culminated in the substantial
amendment of section 6, article XX, to read in part as follows:
(T) he

-harter of such city or town . . . shall be its

organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto
in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits
and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the
state in conflict therewith .... 42
Powers granted by this amendment included the powers of the
home-rule city "to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and
control:"
a. Municipal officers and agencies.
b. Police courts and magistrates.
c. Municipal courts and magistrates.
d. Municipal elections.
39 Mouff v. People,
40 City and County
610 (1919).
41 See text at note
42 Colo. Const., art.

52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912).
of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 238, 184 Pac. 604,
5.
XX, § 6.
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e. Municipal bonds and elections.
f. Municipal park and water districts.
g. Assessment and collection of municipal taxes.
h. Enforcement and collection of fines for violations of municipal regulations.
After the enumeration of the above powers, the following broad
provisions were added as if to remove any doubt of the over-all
scope of home-rule powers:
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to
the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions
the full right to self-government in both local and municipal
matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall
not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the
people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to
the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns,
except in so far as superseded by the charters of such cities
and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
All provisions of the charters of the city and county of
Denver and the cities of Pueblo, Colorado Springs and
Grand Junction ...

not in conflict with this article, and all

elections and electoral votes heretofore had under and
pursuant thereto, are hereby ratified, affirmed and validated
as of their date ....

43

Section 6 also made provision for municipalities other than
Denver to become home-rule cities. Such cities are granted "the
powers set out in Sections 1, 4 and 5 of this Article," as well as those
otherwise stated in Section 6.
The major battle was won, at least for a time. The eight
specific items presumably governed all the areas which the proponents of Section 6 thought had proven or were likely to prove troublesome. The Colorado Supreme Court readily upheld the adoption of
the amendment, and in so doing, noted that if any of the matters
specifically enumerated
in Section 6 were not of local concern be44
fore, they are now.

The first of those eight specified powers is that to legislate upon,
provide, regulate, conduct and control the creation and terms of
municipal officers. In this area, it is now fairly clear that Cassiday
is the rule, that is, the home-rule city can provide for the selection
and term of the officer to do the job, whether the functions are
properly specified by the state legislature or by the council. Thus,
a charter provision for the manager of safety to issue liquor licenses
prevails over the statute providing
that the issuance shall be by
45
the council of a city and county.
But this right of selection has not been left unqualified. It cannot stand in the way of the performance of a function of a statewide nature. Thus, where Denver had not appointed her own registrar
of vital statistics and the legislature had provided for a dis48 Ibid.
44 People v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 134 Poc. 129 (1913).
45 Reed v. Blakely, 115 Colo. 559, 176 P.2d 68 (1946).
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trict covering Denver, Denver could be
4 6 compelled under the
statute to pay the state appointee's salary.
Another of the specific powers provided in Section 6, article
XX, is "the assessment of property in such city or town for municipal
taxation and the levy and collection of taxes thereon for municipal
purposes and special assessments for local improvements." This
clearly met the troublesome "county purpose" tax case 47 which had
been decided immediately before the amendment.
It does not mean, however, that the state cannot require the
Denver treasurer, along with all other county treasurers, to make
certificates as to special assessments due, at least in the absence of
conflicting charter or ordinance provisions.4 The court has also held
that a general statute exempting cemeteries from assessments is
declarative of the public policy of the state and may not be superseded by ordinance. 49 In this case, the 1912 amendment was ignored
and the repudiated Mauff case was cited as authority.
The Tihen case is difficult to follow. Measured by the tests suggested by Antieau,50 the subject matter seems to be solely of local
and municipal concern. Any peculiar desirability of uniform regulation is absent. Historical considerations suggest no general concern.
The effect on people outside the city would be negligible. There is
no necessity for cooperation among governmental units. The history
of article XX, including but not limited to the amendment of Section 6 thereof, indicates that the people desired a liberal attitude by
the courts in finding matters to be of local and municipal concern;
and, conversely, a conservative attitude in finding a matter to be of
state-wide concern. Further, Section 6, article XX, specifically provides that a home-rule city has the "power to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and control ...

the levy and collection of...

special assessments for local improvements." If it be conceded that
that matter is of state-wide concern, a decision that the conflicting
ordinance was superseded by the statute exempting the cemetery
property from the levy of a special assessment would be sound. But
the statement that the city has no power in a matter of state-wide
concern, at least in the absence of a legislative delegation of power,
46 Hershey v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P.2d 266 (1932).
47 Hilts v. Morkey, 52 Colo. 382, 122 Pac. 394 (1912).
48 City and County of Denver v. Highlander Boy Foundation, 102 Colo. 365, 79 P.2d 361 (1938).
49 City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925). In the area of special
assessments, see also County Comm'nrs v. City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919);
Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 1956 (1912).
50 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.36 (1958). See text at note 13.
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totally ignores the historical reasons for and the inferences created
by the 1912 amendment of Section 6, article XX. The court places
emphasis upon the Mauff case as precedent for its decision, but the
dissatisfaction with the Mauff decision precipitated the 1912 amendment of Section 6.
Statutory,51 and even constitutional 52 provisions which, by
their terms, regulate or limit the issuance of bonds have been held
not to be applicable to the issuance of bonds by home-rule cities.
The last of the eight express powers, herein mentioned, is
that for the imposition, enforcement and collection of fines and
penalties for the violation of any of the provisions of the charter
or ordinances. The section additionally provides that any act in
violation of the provisions of a city's charter or any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal and punishable as such when so provided
by any statute now or hereafter in force.
The narrow holding of the Merris case 5 3 is that since there is
a statute which makes driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor a crime, its counterpart in the municipal laws of Canon City
must be tried and punished as a crime. 54 The proper procedure
where there is no state statute is not yet entirely clear.55
Section 6 of article XX makes it clear that the enumeration
therein is by no means exclusive. Nor has there been any suggestion
in the cases since 1913 that beyond the named powers, there are
only those necessarily implied. It is true that since 1913, particularly in areas other than those enumerated in article XX, the court
has tended to hold state legislation applicable to home-rule cities
on the theory of state-wide concern, 56 even though there may be
a conflicting local provision. 57 One exception to this is the well51 Newton v. City of Fort Collins, 78 Colo. 380, 241 Pac. 114 (1925).
52 Montgomery v. City and County of Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P.2d 434 (1938); Clough v. City
of Colorado Springs, 70 Colo. 87, 197 Poc. 896 (1921). Consistent with Clough is City and County of
Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). This holding has since
been nullified because the regulation of a telephone company with properties in numerous municipalities and unincorporated areas was found to be of state concern in People ex rel. Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952). Cases which lend
support to the proposition that constitutional provisions existing prior to, as well as after, the enactment of article XX, constitute limitations on the exercise of local legislative power of home-rule cities
are- Berger v. City and County of Denver, 350 P.2d 192, 194 (Colo. 1960) (equal protection of laws
in overtime parking traffic violation); City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d
441 (1958) (Denver income tax case involving constitutional amendment subsequent to art. XX, (Sec.) 6);
City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958) (the "Bill of Rights" prevails); Deti
v. City of Durango, 136 Colo. 272, 316 P.2d 579 (1957) (lease constituted bn unconstitutional debt);
Kingsley v. City and County of Denver, 126 Colo. 194, 247 P.2d 805 (1952) (voting-machine acquisition case); McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937), involved the
purchase of lands with bond proceeds for Air Corps School and bombing field, in which case, at
page 330, 74 P.2d at 106, the court notes that the bonds were issued under the limitations of Colo.
Const., art. XI, J 8; Lord v. City and County of Denver, 58 Colo. 1, 143 Pac. 284 (1914) (constitutionality of the lending-of-creditprovisions); City and County of Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac.
1066 (1905) (decided.before
6 of art. XX was added).
53 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
54 See earlier cases which viewed similar questions from the standpoint of local and municipal
matter v. state-wide concern: McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1940);
Walker v. People, 55 Colo. 402, 135 Pac. 794 (1913); Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
55 In McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 501, 99 P.2d 969, 973 (1940), an ordinance
making peddling a nuisance, in the absence of any statute on the subject, was held to be of local
concern only "at least until the state has seen fit to exercise its police Powers with reference to it."
56 Spears Clinic and Hospital v. State Board of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 22 P.2d 872 (1950); People
v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940); Denver v. Highlander Boy Foundation, 102 Colo. 365,
79 P.2d 361 (1938); Horst v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937); People
v. City and County of Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 10 P.2d 106 (1932); Armstrong v. Johnson Storage and
Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928); City and County of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329,
266 Pac. 214 (1928).
57 People v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952); Ray v. City and
County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942); People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256
(1941). The first-cited case reversed a long line of decisions relating to utility regulation within
home-rule cities, the first of which was City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). See also Colo. Const., art. XXV, which was added Nov. 2, 1954.
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known right-of-way case, City and County of Denver v. Henry,5
followed in Retallack. The court in Merris added questions of speed,
parking and designation of one-way streets. All of these, the opinion
said, are matters of purely local concern.
However, since the amendment of Section 6 in 1912, the court
has frequently and consistently invoked the so-called Hallett rule
that article XX was intended to confer not only the powers expressly mentioned, but to bestow upon the people of home-rule cities
every power possessed by the legislature in the making of a legislative charter therefor. As we have seen, it has on occasion gone
further and suggested that at least some pre-existing constitutional
provisions have no application. 9
VII. BASIC THEORIES OF HOME-RULE IN COLORADO
A charter is a municipality's organic law and is equivalent to a
state's constitution." The charter, like a state constitution and as
distinguished from the federal constitution, is not a grant of powei
but is a limitation thereon. 61
A home-rule city in Colorado has plenary power in a matter
which is solely of a local and a municipal nature, subject to the
limitations imposed by the state's admission act, the federal constitution and the state constitution. Nothing in the recent cases of
the Colorado
Supreme Court indicates any deviation from this
62
principle.
If, however, the matter is a state affair, the state has jurisdiction
to act,63 and in case of a conflict with municipal charter or ordin58 City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934). This category might
be said to include the extraterritorial condemnation cases, i.e., Toll v. City and County of Denver,
340 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1959); City of Glendale v. City and County of Denver, 137 Colo. 188, 322 P.2d
1053 (1958); City and County of Denver v. Board of Comm'nrs, 113 Colo. 150, 155 P.2d 998 (1945);
Fishel v. City and County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940).
59 See cases cited in note 52, supra. Conceptually, it is not illogical for a court to hold that art.
XX supersedes earlier constitutional provisions by permitting a charter, or even an ordinance, to
supersede any constitutional provision adopted prior to the adoption of art. XX in any manner solely
of local and municipal concern. Similarly, any constitutional provision subsequently adopted can limit
the power of the people of a city so to supersede a constitutional provision in a local and municipal
matter.
60 Colo. Const. art. XX, 1 6. Flanders v. City of Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P.2d 980 (1945); City
and County of Denver v. Board of Comm'nrs, 113 Colo. 150, 155 P.2d 998 (1945); McNichols v. City
and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937).
61 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958); Hawkins v. Hunt, 113
Colo. 468, 160 P.2d 357 (1945); Laverty v. Straub, 110 Colo. 311, 134 P.2d 208 (1943); People v.
Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 12 P.2d 349 (1932).
62 Retallack v. Police Court of City of Colorado Springs, 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960) (reckless
driving is a local affair regulated by ordinance); Burks v. City of Lafayette, 3.49 P.2d 692 (Colo.
1960) (charter can validly fail to restrict referendum in emergency in contravention of statute).
63 Spears Clinic and Hospital v. State Board of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 22 P.2d 872 (1950); Armstrong v. Johnson Storage and Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Poc. 978 (1928); Walker v. People, 55
Colo. 402, 135 Pc,794 (1913).
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ance, the statute controls. 64 Authorities are agreed that, for example,
when a person is required by statute to do something in one manner and is required by ordinance to do the same thing in another
manner, there is a real conflict; and if a matter of state-wide concern, the state's statute should and does control. Such a conflict,
however, is not to be confused with the situation where an ordinance supplements or also regulates a particular subject without actually creating any real conflict.
Furthermore, the powers of a home-rule city can be limited by
the adoption of a constitutional
amendment subsequent to the
6
adoption of article XX.

5

VIII. CONCURRENT POWERS

The Colorado Supreme Court has recently enunciated and
developed the theme that if a matter is a state affair, i.e., is predominately of general interest, a municipality derives no authority
from article XX, and the city can exercise no power in the absence
of a consent of the state.0 6 The court does not indicate whether the
consent can be given by other than the state legislature or a quasilegislative body such as the State Highway Commission, as distinguished from executive officials and department heads. This
principle laid down by the court is all the more surprising in view
of the fact that the majority of jurisdictions concede that a municipality may have concurrent powers or jurisdiction with the state on
a matter which is of state-wide concern and in view of the court's
statement in Sweet that "we know
of no state with any broader
67
home-rule provisions than ours.
In the Merris case, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
"application of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive."'6 It is submitted that this statement of
principle constitutes a revolutionary doctrine and a judicial amendment of article XX.
The court cites in support of this principle the Tihen case 69 and
the Keefe case. 70 The Tihen case based its statement
of this "mutu71
ally exclusive" principle upon the Mauff case.
The Merris case is ill-founded in its designated precedents. The
Keefe and Mauff cases were two of the several cases in the first
decade of home-rule which resulted in the amendment of Section 6,
article XX in 1912. The author of the Tihen case evidently did not
appreciate the fact that dissatisfaction with the "mutually exclusive" rule as enunciated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the ten
years following the adoption of article XX in 1902 i. e., a dissatisfaction with decisions that Denver could not legislate in any particular
field in which the matter in question was not solely of a local and
64 People ex rel. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243
P.2d 397 (1952); City and County of Denver v. Birdwell, 122 Colo. 520, 224 P.2d 217 (1950); Board
of Trustees v. People, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490 (1949); Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109
Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942). See also City of Colorado Sprinos v. Graham, 352 P.2d 273 (Colo.
1960); Welch v. City and County of Denver, 349 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
65 Geer v. Rabinoff, 138 Colo. 8, 328 P.2d 375 (1958).
66 City and County of Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959); Davis v. City and County of
Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959); City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 620 (1958).
67 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). See text at note 73,
infro.
68 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 180, 323 P.2d 614, 620 (1958).
69 City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925). See text note at 49,
supro.
70 Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
71 Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912).
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municipal nature but was also of state-wide concern, resulted 72in the
1912 amendment for the purpose of modifying that principle.
Furthermore, the court is going to find itself on the horns of a
dilemma if it adheres to the "mutually exclusive" principle. Section
6, article XX delineates a number of areas in which a home-rule city
has power to act. For example, Section 6 specifically provides that
a home-rule city has the "power to legislate upon, provide, regulate,
conduct and control ... the levy and collection of taxes and special
assessments . . . to be made by municipal officers or by the city or

state officers as may be provided by charter." Particularly in view of
the court's restrictive views as to what constitutes a matter which is
solely of local and municipal concern, any holding by it that the
charter provisions requiring the collection of special assessments at
a given time in a designated manner by a county treasurer is not
a state matter would be strained. The court's alternatives are to
ignore or "to construe away" this language in the constitution, to
make substantially illogical distinctions among its decisions as to
what constitutes a matter solely of local and municipal concern and
what constitutes a matter also of state-wide concern, or to abandon
the principle in question and to hold that that state and a homerule city can have concurrent jurisdiction concerning the same subject matter. Other specific provisions in Section 6 will result in
similar dilemmas for the court if it continues to adhere to the
"mutually exclusive" principle.
There actually is no sound objection to a doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction in the absence73 of an actual conflict. The "better and
majority" view permits it.

No persuasive reason is suggested as to why, in the criminal
field, for example, a miscreant should be protected from municipal
regulation for a wrong committed within a home-rule city because
the state has concurrent jurisdiction and has made the act in
72 In Davis v. City and County of Denver,

342 P.2d 674, 686 (Colo.

1959), the specially concurring

opinion states that the majority opinion "indicates a retrogression to principles enunciated prior to
our decision in the case of City of Canon City v. Merris." The mplication is surprising from the
statement that the court should ignore a constitutional amendment and return to a principle existing
prior to its modification by the 1912 amendment merely because the court feels the former principle
is preferable. As an example of a case indicating that a home-rule city has concurrent powers with
the state in the absence of a conflict in a matter of state-wide concern see Ray v. City and County
of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942). The decision of the majority is difficult to reconcile
with In re Senate Bill No. 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959), in which the legislature attempted to "consent", i.e., to authorize a home-rule city to legislate in an area of state concern. The court surprisingly held that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

73 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §. 5.20-.21 (1958). See also Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267, 283 (1958); Comment, Conflicts between State Sfatufes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 Harv. L, Rev. 737 (1959).
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question a crime. In a highly urban area, regulation solely by state
officers or pursuant to state statutes may not afford the protection
to which the inhabitants of the city are entitled. The fact that both
the state and the city delineate a series of "do nots" does not impose
any real conflict. Any person can easily comply with the less restrictive limitations by complying with the more restrictive limitations, be they imposed by statute or ordinance. Any suggestion of
"double jeopardy" is a corruption of the intent and purpose of that
constitutional prohibition.
In the financial field, the "mutually exclusive" doctrine, if it
be extended to its logical extreme, would render a municipality
more or less powerless to raise the revenues which are essential
to its continued existence and effective operation in the public interest. Such holdings would render largely nugatory any doctrine of
home- rule powers. Manifestly, if all tax measures are of state-wide
concern, the legislature, "by pulling the purse strings," can effectively control home-rule municipalities and make them largely dependent upon the state.
IX.

PREEMPTION

In the Sweet case, 74 the Colorado Supreme Court held that Denver had no power to levy an income tax, because after the adoption
of article XX, i.e., in 1936, the constitution was amended by the addition of Section 17, article X, which reads: "The general assembly
may levy income taxes, either graduated or proportional, or both
graduated and proportional, for the support of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, or for public schools, and may, in the
administration of an income tax law, provide for special classified
or limited taxation
7 5 or the exemption of tangible and intangible personal property.
The court alluded to the "mutually exclusive" principle discussed
above, and then held that "Section 17 preempted the field of income
taxation for the general assembly" by the section's adoption.
The court states no reason why it feels the adoption of Section
17 preempted the income tax field unless the "reason" be the statement that Section 17 "says that the general assembly may levy this
tax, thus making it solely a matter of state-wide concern." This,
it is submitted, is merely a conclusion, not a reason.
As the court noted Section 7, article X, Colorado Constitution,
provides in part that the "general assembly shall not impose taxes
for the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation." Section 6, article X, provides that "All laws exempting from
taxation, property other than that hereinbefore mentioned shall be
void." Section 17 was adopted to avoid or limit the application of the
constitutional limitations in Section 6 and 7, and perhaps others, to
the field of income taxation. 76 Nothing in the language of the constitution itself, nor in the history concerning the adoption of Section
17, article X, suggests that an "exclusive jurisdiction" nor a "preemption" was intended by the state in relation to the powers of a homerule city. The state was merely adopting a constitutional provision
which would enable it to adopt a graduated income tax law to
74 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
75 Colo. Const., art. X, § 17.
76 City and County of Denver v. Tax Research Bureau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 P.2d 809 (1937).
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solve its financial woes. It is quite another matter to find that the
state thereby intended to preempt the income tax field and prevent
a municipality from levying a similar tax.
Double taxation is commonplace. The federal government, any
state, and its subdivisions, must raise revenues by taxation in order
to defray the costs of necessary funds. Overlapping taxes are almost inevitable, and historically have been quite common, at least
in the field of general (ad valorem) taxes.
Those decisions which have held that a state legislature has
preempted an income tax field by the adoption of a state tax law
of a certain type have been extensively criticized. "The preemption
doctrine is not realistic; it is not sensitive to the fact that all taxes
are imposed on people and that government simply varies the incident by its choices of tax subjects and measures." 7
Another author, skilled in the field of municipal law, states:
The occupation of the field doctrine should be discarded. If the matter is a general one in a home-rule state, or
any kind elsewhere, the legislature can prevent further
municipal regulations by simply indicating its wish. In the
absence of such specific indication of the legislative intent
the judiciary would be well advised to avoid invalidating
municipal ordinances upon inquiries into the legislative
psyche. The doctrine may provide a too handy prop for invalidating municipal rules with which jurists are unsympathetic. One cannot help but notice how avidly courts in77 Fordham and Mollison, Local Incofre Taxation, 11 Ohio St. L.J.217,_223 (1950).
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validate municipal regulations in one 'field' on the theory
that it has been occupied, while condoning considerable
complementary regulation in another. Since it is practically
impossible for either municipal attorney or private counsellor to determine in advance what is the 'field' and to
forecast whether one has been 'occupied' the doctrine is unserviceable to the bar. 8
Nevertheless, a legislature can relatively easily correct any
misconstruction of a tax act by the courts by adopting an amendatory act specifically stating that preemption is not intended.
In the case of a court finding a "constitutional preemption," a
greater dis-service is done, because it is relatively difficult to correct
any court's misconstruction of preemption by the adoption of a
constitutional amendment. 9 There is little reason why a state and
a home-rule city should not have concurrent jurisdiction to levy and
collect the same type of tax. Each political subdivision, as well as the
state, should be responsible for raising the revenue which it needs
for its operation and should have the power so to do on an equitable
basis in the absence of an actual conflict between statute and
ordinance.
Thus, a court should be extremely reluctant to find that a state
statute, let alone a constitutional provision, has preempted a tax
field for the state in the absence of specific language clearly indicating an intent to preempt.
X. SUMMARY
The Colorado Supreme Court should re-examine its recent and
revolutionary cases in the field of home-rule powers and the
"mutually exclusive" and "preemption" doctrines recently enunciated. Any extension of those doctrines, coupled with a restrictive approach as to matters which constitute an affair solely of local and
municipal concern, will gradually erode the substantive powers of a
home-rule municipality until it is largely dependent upon the state
legislature and until the theory of home-rule power effected by the
adoption of article XX has been substantially modified by judicial
construction.
The disruption resulting from the recent cases is already a matter of common knowledge. State police officials and courts are overburdened in enforcing state statutes in the criminal field where
previously regulation was effected primarily in the municipal courts
by municipal police officials, particularly in the case of relatively
minor offenses. The need for additional revenues of municipal corporations in heavily populated urban areas experiencing rapid
growth is a matter of common knowledge. It is not in the public
interest to whittle away a municipality's power of taxation by judicial decision under such circumstances. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any field of taxation in which the court might not hold that the
field has been preempted leaving the municipality without the
power to levy that type of tax. In the case of constitutional preemption, there can be no redress to the legislature.
78 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.22 (1958).
79 Hartman, Municipal Income Taxation, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123, 146 11959).
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The recent federal census has only furnished proof of what
we have known all along - that urban populations have been increasing rapidly while rural populations are in many areas on
the decrease. Most of this increase has been in the fringe areas and
even in the smaller cities surrounding the larger cities. This movement to the cities was accentuated during the war years when persons were engaged in the defense effort and it has continued and
been accelerated by the location of industries which in one way
or another are connected with the production of missiles or other
products of the atomic era.
The concentration of populations in urban areas has led to
fringe strips surrounding cities where persons have been able to
construct housing facilities and, for a time at least, escape the
taxes levied by the adjoining city. But such construction in unincorporated fringe areas has caused many problems for local and
state authorities and the home owners usually find that if they
want all of the services which are afforded by the adjacent city, the
cost in taxes is higher than it would have been if the home had
been constructed in the city.
These problems of the fringe areas would not have arisen
if there had been adequate annexation laws whereby the territory
surrounding cities could be annexed to the city as the need for municipal services grew. But the device of annexation has not been
allowed to accomplish its best results because annexation is all too
often a political matter.
The fixing of municipal boundaries is generally considered to
be a legislative and not a judicial function.1 Since the legislature
has plenary power in respect to municipal corporations, in the absence of any constitutional provisions to the contrary, it may
choose any appropriate agency such as a court, a city council, or the
electors, to determine when an annexation should be made, provided
that the annexation laws define the conditions upon which territory
1 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 7.03 and 7.10 (3d ed. 1949).
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may be annexed and direct the agency tb grant relief on finding
exist, submit
the necessary facts, or, -when the prescribed conditions
2
the final determination to the electors interested.
It is well settled in this state that statutes which vest in courts,
political bodies, or the people of a community, authority to determine and change, under the provisions of the law, the boundaries of
cities and towns, are not a delegation of the power to make laws,
and therefore are not violative of the maxim that the power conbe delegated by that department
ferred upon the legislature cannot
3
to any other body or authority.
Territory may be annexed to a municipality without the consent of the owners of the property to be annexed,4 without submitting the question to the determination of the electors of the city, 5
and probably without obtaining the consent of the city itself, although a statute may require the consent of the city.6 While the
claim is often made that Denver cannot annex adjoining property
and thus change county boundaries without a vote of the electors
of such adjoining
county, this claim has twice been refuted by the
7
supreme court.
The Colorado Constitution forbids the passage of local or special
laws where a general law can be made applicable. 8 It further requires the general assembly to provide by general laws for the organization and classification of cities and towns into classes not
exceeding four in number; and the powers of each class shall be
defined by general laws.9 Under these constitutional provisions, all
annexation acts must be general in nature and apply in the same
manner to all municipal corporations of the same class. Several
Colorado cases have held that annexation statutes did not constitute special legislation. 10
The constitution would probably prohibit the annexation of
non-contiguous lands," and the annexation of land already included
in another city or town.12 The annexation statute 3 requires as a
condition of annexation that the land be contiguous and unincorporated. But outside of these, there are practically no restrictions
upon the power of the legislature to prescribe the terms of annexation.
Prior to the 1945 amendment, Colorado had a conglomeration
of statutes which varied greatly in the methods employed for annexation:
(1) Where land was platted as an addition and the owners of
2 Mayor of Valverde v. Shattuck, 19 Colo. 104, 34 Pac. 947 (1893).
3 Town of Edgewater v. Liebhardt, 32 Colo. 307, 76 Pac. 366 (1904); Rhodes v. Fleming, 10
Colo. 553, 16 Pac. 298 (1887).
4 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 7.16 (3d. ed. 1949); See also People ex rel. Simon v.
Anderson, 112 Colo. 558, 151 P.2d 972 (1944).
5 Mayor of Valverde v. Shattuck, 19 Colo. 104, 34 Pac. 947 (1893).
6 Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 Pac. 747 (1899).
7 Simon v. County of Arapahoe, 80 Colo. 445, 252 Pac. 811 (1927). Simon v. Anderson, 112 Colo.
558, 151 P.2d 972 (1944).
8 Colo. Const., art. V, 1 25.
9 Colo. Const., art. XIV, § 13.
10 Relchelt v. Town of Julesburg, 90 Colo. 258, 8 P.2d 708 (1932); Mayor of Valverde v. Shuttuck,
19 Colo. 104, 34 Pac. 947 (1893).
11 Town of Greenwood Village v. Heckendorf, 126 Colo. 180, 247 P.2d 678 (1952); City of Denver
v. Coulehon, 20 Colo. 471, 39 Pac. 425 (1894).
12 In re City of Denver, 18 Colo. 288, 32 Pac. 615 (1893).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-2 (2) (1953).
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two-thirds of the area petitioned the city for annexation, the coun-4
cil could annex upon a three-fourths vote of the council members.1
(2) If the council desired to annex contiguous territory, it might
by ordinance submit the question of annexation to the qualified
electors of the city, and if a majority voted in favor thereof, the
territory was annexed; provided that unplatted land must have the
written consent of the owners unless the tract was four acres or less
in size and at least one-half of the boundaries were contiguous to the
city. 15

(3) If contiguous land had been platted, the city council might
petition the county court and after notice, if the court found that
"justice and equity require that said territory or any part thereof
should be annexed to such corporation, a decree shall be enacted
accordingly . .

.,,"

(4) Whenever any tract of land containing not less than forty
acres adjoining any city had been subdivided and a plat recorded,
the majority of the owners of the lands included might petition the
county court for annexation. If the council did not show cause why
the land should not be annexed, the question of annexation was
submitted to the electors, and if the vote was in favor17 of annexation, the court entered a decree annexing the territory.
(5) Whenever any tract of land adjoining a city of the first class
had been platted, the council might publish a notice of the time and
place of a hearing upon annexing such territory, and after hearing
any objections thereto, the council might by ordinance declare such
land annexed; provided that if such tract to be annexed contained
fifty or more inhabitants, a majority of the qualified electors therein should first consent to such annexation.' s
It will thus be seen that all of the various methods of annexation were being used in Colorado - the judicial decree, council
action, vote of the residents of the area to be annexed, and vote,
of the electors of the city to which the territory was to be annexed.
It was then thought that it would be better to have just one
method of annexation to fit all situations and in 1945 an act was
passed which repealed all other acts. It defined what territory
rnight be annexed and required the proceedings to be initiated by
14 Colo.
15 Colo.
16 Cola.
17 Colo.
18 Colo.

Sess. Laws 1887, § 1 at 432.
Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 116 § 1 at 426.
Gen. Stat. 1883. ch. 109 § 3307 at 963.
5 at 390.
Sess. Laws 1891.
6 at 378.
Sess. Laws 1891,
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the owners of at least two-thirds of the area to be annexed.1 9 If the
city council approved the annexation, it petitioned the county court
and notice of hearing was published. At such hearing, if the court
found that the petition was true and the notice was valid, it appointed five commissioners to hold an election among the landowners residing within the territory to be annexed and who paid or
were liable for a tax on real estate therein during the year preceding that in which the petition was filed. If the commissioners
found that there were less than twenty-five electors qualified to
vote and that at least two-thirds of those electors had consented
to such annexation in writing, the court might dispense with the
election.
This 1945 law was too complicated for most annexations. It was
also too strict in its requirements to be of any assistance to cities
which were trying to improve fringe areas by annexation. Consequently many and various attempts have been made to improve
upon the annexation statute, but most of these have either failed
or been amended so as to place even more restrictions upon annexation and make the law more indefinite and confusing than ever. The
annexation law is now totally inadequate to handle a complicated
annexation dispute in which both sides are represented by counsel
and in which counsel desire to raise the numerous questions which
remain unanswered in the statute.
The first amendment in 1947,20 in order to protect certain special
interests, added a restriction that land which was completely surrounded by a municipality could not be annexed until after it had
been completely surrounded for a period of twenty years. While
the 1945 act required an annexation petition to be filed by the
owners of two-thirds of the area to be annexed - a requirement
which was admittedly too strict - the amendment, in reducing the
number of signers to more than fifty per cent of the area, added
the further requirement that such owners "shall also comprise a
majority of the landowners residing in the territory at the time the
petition is filed, provided that when there are no residents of the
territory then the signatures of owners of over one-half of the area
of the territory involved will be sufficient for the purposes of this
Act."21
A corporation may be a landowner and it could sign a petition
for annexation, yet it is not a resident, and under the law it could
not be counted in determining a majority of the resident landowners. If there were no residents of an area to be annexed, then
the owners of fifty-one per cent of the area could initiate annexation. But if there was only one resident landowner, a petition signed
by the owners of 99% of the area, if they were not residents, would
not be sufficient.
While the 1945 act required an election unless there were less
than twenty-five electors qualified to vote and two-thirds of them
consented to the annexation in writing, the 1947 act provided that
it was not necessary to hold an election unless a counter petition
was signed by persons who would have been qualified to sign the
petition for annexation in a number of not less than two-thirds of
19 Colo. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 243
29 C.1. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 314
21 Colo. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 314

3 at 675-76.
2 at 855.
3 at 856.
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the number of signatures on the petition to annex. The law expressly provides that persons who signed the petition for annexation
may also sign the counter petition against annexation. Many tim-es
persons will sign a petition for annexation and then change their
minds and sign a counter petition against anexation. Sometimes
they will change their minds again and will be in favor of annexation at the time of the election. How, then, can one know whether a
person is really for or against annexation?
At such an election, only resident landowners can vote. A landowner is one who owns real property therein and who has paid or
become liable for a property tax thereon. A resident is defined as a
qualified elector. If there are any residents, a church which owns
property in the territory cannot be a landowner because it pays
no taxes. A corporation which owns land cannot vote because it is
not a resident elector. One or more resident electors can therefore
defeat annexation even though they own only a small percentage
of the area because they may be the only persons qualified to vote.
How is the ownership of fifty per cent of the area to be annexed calculated? When such land has been platted, are the streets
and alleys included in the area to be annexed and does this deficiency have to be overcome by obtaining signatures of persons who
own much more than fifty per cent of the property that is actually
in private ownership? And since a "landowner" is defined in the
same terms as a "taxpayer," can a church for instance sign as the
owner of land when it pays no taxes? These are other questions
which provide stumbling blocks useful to opponents of annexations.
The questions must remain unanswered until the supreme court
provides some of the answers.
The method of annexing by petition is also very rigid. Under
the judicial decision method used in the State of Virginia, the court
may alter the metes and bounds of the area to be annexed and thus
22
prevent cities from annexing good areas and excluding the bad.
But under the Colorado method, after a petition23 for annexation has
been signed, the boundaries cannot be changed.
Numerous attempts have been made to improve upon the Colorado law by amending it to abolish or shorten the period of immunity
from annexation provided for land that is entirely surrounded by
a city; to provide for the initiation of annexation proceedings by a
city council; to provide for annexation of land that would be included within a straight line drawn between two points on the
boundaries of the annexing municipality; to provide a different procedure for annexation by cities under two hundred thousand population from that applicable to the City and County of Denver; to
merely clarify some of the definitions and procedural requirements;
and to provide for a judicial determination similar to the Virginia
plan under which the court has to determine the "necessity for and
expediency of" annexation. But all of these attempts have met with
defeat.
In 1959 a comprehensive amendment was prepared which carefully prescribed standards that a city council had to find to be in
existence before it could initiate annexation proceedings; if proceedings were initiated by the landowners, the council could impose con22 Bain, Terms and Conditions of Annexation under the 1952 Stntute. 41 Vn. L. Rev. 1129 (1955).
23 People v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist., 343 P.2d 812 (Cola. 1959).
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ditions upon such annexation, and if fifty-one per cent of the landowners objected to such conditions, an election was to be held
among the landowners; and any landowner was entitled to a judicial
review of any decision on annexation. This proposal died in committee.
What are the reasons for this determined opposition to a more
liberal annexation law? At first it was thought by many that the
opposition came from the tri-county area surrounding Denver and
that it resulted from the fact that Denver was both a city and a
county and that every time an annexation was made to Denver,
one of the adjoining counties lost a portion of its tax base. This
opposition would be understandable. But proposed bills which excluded Denver from their operation likewise went down to defeat.
A more recent source of opposition has arisen in some of the
cities, themselves. Where cities are located closely to each other
there is some spirit of rivalry for annexations and each is jealous
of gains made by the other. This is apparent in recent attacks upon
Denver merely because it is abolishing its requirement for payment
of an annexation fee - a requirement which was seldom, if ever,
used.
A third source of opposition, and probably the most powerful of
all, comes from special interest groups of large industries or
businesses which have grown up adjacent to cities. It is not difficult
for these businesses to persuade the city councils that they should
have water and sewer services if they are immediately adjacent to
the city. They sometimes also obtain fire protection from the city,
either because of a "good neighbor" policy or because the city will
fight a fire to prevent its spread into the adjoining city. These
businesses, then, have nothing to gain from annexation and the
possibility of a tax increase leads them to oppose any statutory
amendment which might lead to the annexation of their property.
Since annexation is a legislative matter, courts cannot interfere
by injunction, 24 or with the legislative decision. 25 But opponents can

question the validity of the petition or the procedure before the
council; again question it in a proceeding in the nature of certiorari
in the district court; and finally appeal to the supreme court for an
answer to the many questions that can be raised. Contested annexations are thus subjected to long delays.
It is hard to visualize what the ultimate solution to the annexation problem in Colorado will be. It may be that the law will only
be liberalized to permit the annexation of substandard areas. This
would be expensive to the cities involved, and it would not be welcomed, because cities should be able to annex the good areas with
the bad areas.
Annexation is a tool that can be used in providing a local
government for urban areas, thus helping to solve "metropolitan"
problems. But the tool in Colorado is a highly unworkable instrument. Its indefinateness, lack of clarity, and myriad of unanswered
questions results in a fertile field for litigation which can postpone
annexations almost to the point of prohibiting them entirely.
24 City of Denver v. Board of County Comm'r. of Arapahoe County, 347 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1959).
25 Brown v. City of Denver, 3 Colo. 169 (1877).
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CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

EMINENT DOMAIN

The Denver City Council enacted an ordinance ' which granted
to the State Department of Highways the right to construct and
maintain a highway, extending along the eastern section of City
Park. Petitioner, a citizen of the city and abutting property owner,
alleged that the proposed grant of park land was void since it
violated the state constitution and the City Charter. It was proposed
that such land was held in trust, dedicated to use of the public;
therefore, the city, acting as trustee, was powerless to convey this
property unless the state should institute condemnation proceedings.
The court affirmed a judgement declaring the proceedings to be a
"useless act" because both the City Council and the Department of
Highways had previously agreed upon adequate compensation and
damages to be paid for the land. Welch v. City and County of Denver, 349 P. 2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
It was established in McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County2 that land dedicated to public use as a public
park cannot be conveyed away or alienated to a use inconsistent
with that of its dedication. In that case the city attempted to convey
a section of public park land to the county for erection of a courthouse. It was held that the city, as trustee, had no authority for such
conveyance. 3 The court further stated that if land is dedicated for a
park, the citizens, beneficiaries of the trust, are entitled to use of the
whole. If trustees are permitted to say that a particular section is
not needed or necessary for the dedicated purpose, then it follows
that the larger portion of it is not
so needed; thus, the entire pur4
pose of the dedication is defeated.
The charter of Denver provides that no section of any park land
belonging to or acquired by the City and County of Denver shall be
sold or leased at any time. 5 The Colorado Constitution states that the
people of the City and County of Denver are vested with exclusive6
power in making, altering, revising or amending their charter.
Numerous state courts have repeatedly held that a municipality,
standing as trustee to property dedicated to public use, may not
convey such property to a use completely inconsistent 7with limitations arising out of the trust or dedication agreement.
Granted, the state's power to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, lands of municipal corporations has been delegated to the Department of Highways. 8 However, the "or otherwise" clause does
not constitute an absolute power.9 Upon dismissing a petition to
1 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 302 (1958), provides in pertinent part: " ...
the Council
of the City and County of Denver hereby gives and grants unto the Department of Highways . . .
the right and privilege to construct and maintain a street and highway in the following described
real property . . . in connection with and as a part of the improvement . . . of State Highway No.
153 and Ho. 2 which pass throuah the City and County of Denver."
2 15 Colo. App. 78, 61 Pac. 237 (1900).
3 Id. at 85.
4 Id. at 85-86.
5 Colo. Const. art. XX. 0 5 as amended by Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 84 (5) (1955).
6 Colo. Const. art. XX, 1 5 (1950).
7 Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 II. 308, 71 N.E. 408 (1904); Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361
(1871); Boston and Albany Railroad Co., 53 N.Y. 574 (1873); Zachry v. City of Son Antonio, 157 Tex.
551, 305 S.W.2d 558 (1957); Rayor v. City of Cheyenne, 63 Wyo. 72, 178 P.2d 115 (1947).
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. if 120-3-17, 120-13-35(11) (1953).
9 Town of Eaton v. Bouslog. 133 Colo. 130, 292 P.2d 343 (1956).
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condemn land for cemetery purposes in Town of Eaton v. Bauslog,10
the court stated that municipalities are permitted by statute 1 to
establish and regulate cemeteries, and acquire land therefore by
purchase or otherwise. But it cannot be implied from the word
"otherwise" that the town has authority to condemn land for such
the
purpose. If it can be said that use of this word
12 creates a doubt,
power of condemnation has not been granted.
Petitioners in Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora13 sought
to condemn land used as a public cemetery for the purpose of expanding reservoir facilities. The court stated that vague or doubtful
language found in statutes must be excluded. 14 The power is withheld unless it is specifically and unequivocally granted.1 5 Of course,
authorities unanimously affirm the proposition that the state may
condemn any land which it deems necessary and proper, 6 and such
action will not be questioned
unless it is fraudulent or no actual
17
public need existed.
Authorities in other jurisdictions tend to strengthen petitioner's
argument in the instant case. United States v. Carmack's questioned
whether the Federal Works Administration was authorized to acquire land held in trust by the town for its inhabitants and used for
such public purposes as a local park, courthouse, city hall and public
library. The Court allowed voluntary conveyance of whatever title
the city was able to convey. However, the Court took notice of restrictions in the conveyance, arising out of the trust relationship, and
permitted all claimants to any interest through the grantors of the
disputed site to be joined as defendants. 19 Thus, a decree of condemnation disposed of the suggested defects and provided a judicial process for securing better title than may be obtained solely by voluntary conveyance.20
The majority of the court in the Welch case pointed out that a
successful agreement concerning adequate compensation and damages was reached. They held that this satisfied the required condition precedent to an institution of eminent domain proceedings namely, that such agreement be attempted. 2 1 Further, the court
reasoned, if a compromise was obtained, why should the state be
compelled to institute condemnation proceedings?
It appears that the trust relationship existing between the city
and petitioner was entirely discarded. This conveyance deprived the
petitioner, as a beneficiary of the park's dedication, of her rights
22
which are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
10 Ibid.
II Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1(32) (1953).
12 Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, supro at 132.
13 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
14 Id. at 272.
15 Ibid.
16 Burns v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n., 325 Moss. 731, 92 N.E.2d 391 (1950).
17 Jennings v. Bd. of Comm'ns. of Montrose County, 85 Colo. 498, 277 Pac. 467 (1929); Alabama
Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (1922); Carstens v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln
County, 111 P.2d 583 (1941).
18 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
19 Id. at 239.
20 Ibid.
21 Accord, Stalford v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Prowers County, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436
(1953); Old Timers' Baseball Ass'n v. Housing Authority of Denver, 122 Colo. 597, 224 P.2d 219
(1950); Mulford v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 62 Colo. 167, 161 Pac. 301 (1916).
-1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: " . . . nor shall any state deprive
any peron of life, lib'rtv or oropertv without due process of low, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of 'he laws."
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Eustace v. Dickey2 3 and In re Fulton's WillJ 2 4 are just two examples
of the recognized principle that a trustee has a duty to administer
the trust solely in the beneficiary's interest and may not change the
scope of the purposes25for which such property is held without the
beneficiary's consent.
Thus, it seems that the Welch case is a novel and radical decision in Colorado. It is submitted that the court went beyond its
limitations in approving the city's action. The ordinance 26 granting
park land to the Department of Highways obviously amounted to a
sale. There was an exchange of an interest in the land for damages
paid to the city. Since the court evidently interpreted this transaction as constituting an easement, it is apparent that this was an
"evasive device" to by-pass provisions of the state constitution.
Although the state, exercising its sovereign rights, may condemn such land, its approach in this instance was without precedent.
Petitioner proved her interest in contesting the action, yet she was
not even allowed to voice her disapproval in a court of law. Further
application of this view to similar areas of the law will substantially
minimize individual rights as quaranteed
by the Constitutions of the
28
United States2 7 and of Colorado.
-M.

NEAL SINGER

23 240 Mass. 55, 132 N.E. 852 (1921).
24 2 N.Y.S.2d 917, 253 App. Div. 494 (1938).
25 Rottger v. First-Merchants' Not. Bank of Lafayette, 98 Ind. App. 139, 184 N.E. 267 (1933).
26 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 302 (1958).
27 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 5 (1950).
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CONCURRENT AND CONFLICTING REGULATIONS BY STATE
AND MUNICIPALITY - VIOLATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
REGULATIONS
The defendant was charged with violating a municipal ordinance' of the City of Colorado Springs for reckless driving, which included, as a lesser offense, the charge of careless driving. This action
was to be brought before the Colorado Springs Municipal Court, but
the defendant contended that the offense was one of state-wide concern with a counter-part criminal statute 2 enacted by the General
Assembly of the State of Colorado which, consequently, required
that the case be tried under rules prescribed for the conduct of
criminal cases for violation of the state criminal statute. The city
contended that reckless driving was a matter of municipal, not statewide, concern; and it was asserted that the provision in the ordinance, which makes exceeding fifty-five miles per hour within the
city prima facie evidence of reckless driving, cannot be enforced
under the state statute because no identical counter-part of the
ordinance on reckless driving was in the state statutes. The city
alleged that as a twentieth amendment home-rule city3 it had
jurisdiction to try this case since the intention of the amendment
was to give the people of any municipality coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal
matters. The question to be determined by the court was whether
reckless driving was a matter of municipal and local concern to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the state court. The court held that
reckless driving was a municipal matter because it is a relative thing
that is dependent upon many variable and local circumstances.
Retallack v. City of Colorado Springs, 351 P.2d 844 (Colo.1969).
The state legislature invested municipalities with control of
vehicular traffic prior to the adoption of article XX of the constitution of Colorado.4 After the adoption of section 6 of article XX,
municipalities were given the power essential to the full exercise
of the right of self-government in both local and municipal matters.
The state statutes still applied to these cities, except in so far as
they were replaced or superseded by city charters or ordinances;
and, when so replaced, the cities were undoubtedly
given the power
5
to reasonably regulate vehicular traffic.
Generally, matters of state-wide concern can be readily distinguished from matters of local and municipal scope, but there is
a wide range of cases that overlap into these two distinct areas that
cannot readily be discerned. There is no question that such matters
as homicide, rape, burglary, and other such offenses are of state-wide
concern.6 Similarly, there is no controversy that such matters as are
1 Colorado Springs, Colo., Ordinanc 2432 g 1. The ordinance makes it an offense for any person to drive any vehicle in the City of Colorado Springs in such a manner that the safety of persons
or property is willfully or wantonly disregarded, and exceeding the speed of fifty-five miles per hour
shall be prima facie evidence of reckless driving.
2 The statute was not cited in the opinion, but is believed to be Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-31
(amend. 1957).
3 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 provides: "Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in
such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town
any law of the state in conflict therewith."
4 C. L. 1921. p. 2290, f 8987, par. 7.
5 Staley v. Vaughn, 92 Colo. 6, 17 P.2d 299 (1932).
6 Retallack v. City of Colorado Springs, 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960). This was dictum in the
principal case and was referred to in Mr. Justice Hall's dissenting opinion.
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enumerated in the Colorado Revised Statutes' are of local concern. These matters are: regulation of standing or parked vehicles,
regulation of traffic by traffic control signals or police officers,
regulation of processions or assemblages on the highways, establishing one-way streets, regulating the speed of vehicles, and setting up
through streets. Other matters, by adjudication, have been determined to be of either statewide or local concern.9
An early Colorado decision ' established the doctrine that a violation of a municipal ordinance which imposed a fine or imprisonment as the penalty was to be tried as a civil action. The rule established by this decision persisted and had been cited as authority for
many years, despite the opposition it had encountered from several
judges."' The courts complied with this doctrine, after it had been
established, principally because they felt bound by precedent. In
1958, the Colorado Supreme Court took a bold stand by sustaining
a trial court decision which held that a person on trial for violation
7 Coo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4.7(a) to (f) (1953).
SPeople v. Denver, 60 Colo. 370, 153 Pac. 690 (1915) (regulating the traffic in intoxicating liq.
uors); Holyoke v. Smith, 75 Colo. 286, 226 Pac. 158 (1924) (fixing rates of a public utilities commission); Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925) (cemeteries are expressly excluded by state
statute from paying special assessments for local improvements); Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 266
Pac. 214 (1928) (the building of a county court house and the preference of Colorado materials in its
construction); Armstrong v. Johnson Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928) (imposing additional state
license fees on motor trucks); People v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P.2d 266 (1932) (the office of,
and appointments to, local registrar); Denver v. Highlander Foundation, 102 Colo. 365, 79 P.2d 361
(1938) (statute requiring county treasurers, upon request, to furnish statements of taxes due); Denver
v. People, 103 Colo. 565, 88 P.2d 89 (1939) (control of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and the collection of statutory fees); People Ex Rel. v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940)
(regulation of the statute enacted in compliance with the Federal Housing Act); People v. Graham,
107 Colo. 202. 110 P.2d 256 (1941) (the Uniform Safety Code is effective throughout the state);
Ray v. Denver. 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942) (regulation of the Small Loans Act); Spears Hospital v. State Board, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950) (the licensing of hospitals); People Ex Rel. v.
Denver, 125 Colo. 167. 243 P.2d 397 (1952) (intra city business conducted by a telephone company);
Zerobnick v. Denver, 337 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1959) (power to punish vagrancy and keeping a gambling
house); Davis v. Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959) (driving a car in a city after one's license is
suspended or revoked).
9 County Com'nrs v. City, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919) (special assessments may be collected for local improvements); City of Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447, 182 Pac. 884 (1919) (the impounding of animals running at large and charging fees for estray animals); City and County of
Denver v. Stenger, 277 F. 865 (1921) (regulation of rates to be charged by street railways within the
city); Clough v. Colorado Springs. 70 Colo. 87, 197 Pac. 896 (1921) (a city has the power to call a
special election for voting an bands for paving contracts); People v. Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 12 P.2d
349 (1932) (a city council may establish a municipal court); McNichols v. Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74
P.2d 99 (1937) (the issuance of bonds for the purchase of a bombing field to be donated to the
federal government); McCormick v. Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939) (ordinance restricting
the operations of peddlers at private residences); Fishel v. Denver, 106 Cola. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940)
(the condemnation of land for the use of a bombing range); Brodhead v. Denver, 126 Colo. 119, 247
P.2d 140 (1952) (purchase of revenue bonds to finance off-street parking facilities); Kingsley v. Denver, 126 Colo. 194, 247 P.2d 805 (1952) (purchase of voting machines); Heron v. Denver, 131 Colo.
501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955) (requiring plans and specifications for buildings of a public or semi-public
nature to be prepared and submitted by an architect); Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959)
(speeding upon the Valley Highway through Denver).
10 Dietz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323 (1871).
11 36 DICTA 11 (1959).
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of a municipal ordinance, punishable by fine or imprisonment, was
entitled to all the constitutional guarantees traditionally surrounding criminal trials. This was the famous Merris decision 12 which
arose from the violation of a city ordinance forbidding the operation
of a motor vehicle on the streets of Canon City, Colorado, while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The holding of this case
guarantees a defendant, who is charged with the violation of a
municipal ordinance which has a counter-part state statute, with the
following rights and privileges: the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to be informed of the nature of the charges
against him, to meet the witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and the right to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed. 13 Thus, the advantages of trying a case that is of state-wide concern, rather than local,
can be recognized.
The courts are now left with the problem of determining the
scope of various municipal ordinances and state statutes, whose
limits of applicability have not, as yet, been established. Therefore,
the question to be answered by the courts is whether the conduct14
complained of is a matter of exclusive local or state-wide concern.
There is no simple solution to this problem, and its complicity is
increased by the fact that so many matters partake of some, or all,
of the qualities of both the state and local categories. 15 Only by
determining which category predominates, can the courts arrive at
a just decision.
No definite test has yet been established to aid the courts in
the determination of whether a matter is predominately state-wide
or local in nature. Prior to the Merris case a test was applied' 6 to
determine whether a municipal ordinance superseded a state statute, but no solution to the problem of whether a matter is predominately state-wide or local was given. Consideration, then must be
given to related matters to resolve this problem; determining the
dependency of any particular matter upon such elements as time
and circumstance 17 may aid in this resolution. Whatever method the
courts devise to solve this problem, it is certain that definite and
inflexible rules cannot be established. If this were done, the Supreme
Court would be continually called upon to rule whether a subject
is local or state-wide.' 8 Consequently, it is apparent that in the future each particular case will have to be decided independently and
upon its merits.
In the recent case of Davis v. Denver,19 the Colorado Supreme
Court offered a suggestion that may prove to be a workable solution to the problem of distinguishing state-wide matters from those
that are local. The court suggested that the state be allowed to
delegate certain police powers to cities in the areas where the sub12 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
13 Colo. Const. art. 11, 9 16.
14 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267, 271 (1958).
15 37 DICTA 45 (1960).
16 Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942), states that if a municipal ordinance of a
home-rule city is in conflict with general state low, the test to determine if one shall supersede the
other is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids or vice versa.
17 People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941), states that what is local, as distinguished
from general and state-wide, depends somewhat upon time and circumstances.
18 Davis v. Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Cola. 1959).
19 Ibid.
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ject matter of the controversy, while predominately general, is to
some extent municipal. 20 Whether this can be accomplished, remains
to be seen.
The Merris case opened the door to the question of jurisdiction
between municipalities and the state when both city ordinances and
state statutes provide for identical matters. The Retallack case,
which holds that reckless driving within the boundaries of a homerule city is a municipal concern, is but one step in the course of
litigation that is certain to arise over similar matters.
One Colorado case has already appeared subsequent to the
Retallack decision which held that larceny is not a matter of local
or municipal concern. 21 In this decision, which contained two concurring opinions, all the cases relating to the state-wide v. local
matters that have arisen since the Merris case were considered. This
decision gives one a clue as to what the courts will consider before
arriving at a definite conclusion that a matter is either local or statewide in nature; the courts are likely to consider the historical and
analytical factors involved in each particular area of law, and the
field of regulation sought to be enforced. 22 This cannot be considered a test, for, at most, it is merely obiter dictum.
There are, I believe, many other factors to be considered before
arriving at a decision in cases which attempt to determine the local
or state-wide nature of an action. Some factors that are likely to be
considered are: the interests of the community as contrasted to
those of the state, the illegal activity from which the action arose,
the historical development of the right of pre-emption within the
state, and the desirability of both expedience and the preservation
of the right of trial by jury in the settlement of a case. Undoubtedly,
other factors will also be used to decide cases that involve concurrent regulations established by both the municipality and the state.
It is certain that in the near future, much litigation will arise concerning questions similar to the issue involved in the principal case.
James D. Whitaker
20 Id. at 677.
21 Gazotti v. City and County of Denver, 352 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960).
22 Id. at 966, 967. This was brought out in Mr. Justice Doyle's concurring opinion.
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Two member law firm in Northeastern Colorado town surrounded
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A MEMORIAL TO DEAN

GEORGE C. MANLY
Many of the graduates from the University of Denver
College of Law remember the late dean George C. Manly who
helped found the Denver Law School in 1892 and was one of
its sixteen original faculty members. He was a beloved dean
of the College of Law from 1910 to 1926, president of the
Denver Bar Association in 1913, president of the Colorado Bar
Association in 1921, and a member of the general council of
the American Bar Association from 1908 until 1912.
Many of his past students and friends have expressed a
desire to honor dean Manly by establishing a memorial in his
name in the new University of Denver Law Center. It has
been suggested that a fund to endow an annual outstanding
lecture series to inspire the practicing attorney, the law
teacher, and the law student would be a fitting memorial to
dean Manly.
We ask you to join us in establishing a memorial to him
who so capably served our legal fraternity until his death in
1936.
The sponsoring committee of:
THE DEAN GEORGE C. MANLY MEMORIAL FUND
Wayne N. Aspinal
Archibald A. Lee
William M. Bristol
Thomas J. Morrissey
John E. Gorsuch

Please address inquiries to John E. Gorsuch, Equitable Building, Denver, Colorado.

